

Online Appendix:

Groups, Parties, and Policy Demands in House Nominations

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Research on this paper is ongoing and may lead to changes in the cases summaries and classifications described in this Online Appendix. The Appendix will be updated accordingly, with new versions dated and previous versions remaining available.

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The bulk of the evidence in our published paper consists of examples from about a dozen of the 53 Winnable Open Seat Primaries in the 2013-14 electoral cycle. There are two reasons for this. The first is that most readers do not want to read 53 case studies. They want simplification – a handful of developed illustrations to stand for the overall set of data. The second is that we were able to learn more about some cases than others and wish to feature the cases for which we have the fullest information.

There is nothing wrong in using examples to create a characterization of reality, provided the examples are roughly representative of the larger set of cases. The question we consider in this online appendix is whether this condition has been met for one of the claims we have advanced in the paper, namely, the claim that most winning candidates “anchor” their campaign in a particular group or party. In the text of the paper, we present only examples of anchoring. Here we shall specify criteria for anchoring and assess how often these criteria are met in our full set of 53 cases.

The evidence for this assessment will come from thumbnail studies that show for each of the 53 contests whether the criteria have been met in that case. The reader can study, lightly browse, or sample a few of these cases studies, depending on her interest the subject.

In future work, we intend to provide similar assessments concerning the frequency of establishment and insurgency candidates, their frequency of success, and the conditions under which they succeed or fail.

This online appendix has five parts: Conceptualization of anchoring; criteria for a measure of anchoring; resulting classifications; case studies; summary table of classifications.

1. Conceptualization

A key concern in the paper is the frequency of anchoring of campaigns in a single group or party. When we say that a campaign is “anchored” we mean that the campaign has received an amount of support from a single group or party that was sufficient to make it electorally viable.

Thus conceptualized, anchoring does not indicate certain victory, but only reasonable chance to win. Anchored candidates are likely to be in the top two or three candidates in their race, but not necessarily the favorite to win. Classification of a group's support for a candidate as anchoring also does not mean that that candidate needed it to win, since a small number of candidates won without having an anchoring group or party. Nor, finally, does classification of a campaign as anchored in one group preclude the campaign being anchored in a second group, provided that the required amount of support has been forthcoming from both groups. (Anchoring by two groups is not common, but where it occurs, we shall note it in the case summaries below.)

The common theme in these caveats is that the amount of support involved in anchoring is, in the end, just that – *an amount of support*, a kind of standardized unit of campaign resources received by a campaign from a group. What this support accomplishes or fails to accomplish in a particular primary depends to some degree on context and is not part of the definition of anchoring.

By group we mean any set of individuals animated by a common political concern and organized independently of the campaign in supports. The group demand may be material (e.g., lower taxes) or ideal (e.g., equal rights), and it may be secondary to a group's main purpose, as when a church group, whose first purpose is worship, supports a candidate who opposes abortion. By party, we mean a diverse set of individuals working in coalition to gain control of government for their purposes.

We acknowledge a potential chicken-and-egg problem in any observational study of candidate support: The question of whether candidates get support because they are already viable or become viable as a result of getting support. Presumably both processes are at work. (See discussion of this problem below for the case of Norma Torres in the California 35th district)

2. Operationalization

As outlined in the text, we propose four potential forms of anchoring support. Here we discuss each in more detail.

Coordinated support. Coordinated support for a candidate is more than a candidate with diverse groups supporting her. It is, as we use the phrase, diverse groups making a decision to work together in support of a candidate. The coordinating actors must also have a relationship with one another that is independent of and prior to the candidacy they support. Political parties are, by this understanding, a form of coordinated action because they nearly always involve diverse actors working together over a period that antedates the candidacies they support.

Yet, not every party organization merits classification as a coordinating body. Party committees existed in every county in our study, but most controlled no resources and made no effort to influence a House primary. But where county party committees were active, which was mainly most in the mid-Atlantic states, they might command substantial resources, often greater than those of any other political player in the district. The New Jersey 3rd and Pennsylvania 6th cases are examples from previous discussion. Informal parties – such as Sandy Levin’s IPO in the Michigan 14th district – were not based on county committees but on an informal network. The national congressional party committees were active in a few more. In one case (CA-11), national party leaders were influential through informal channels. (Details for these examples are in the text or in the appendix cases studies below.)

When backed by substantial resources, the endorsement of any one of these forms of party conferred viability on its preferred candidate by making clear that she or he would be able to run a strong campaign. Party endorsements backed by substantial resources also tended to discourage non-endorsed candidates from entering the race, thereby making it easier for the party candidate to prevail.

One can tabulate from the case studies below that 23 of 25 party-anchored candidates not only achieved viability, but won their primaries. One of the two exceptions was a primary in which two candidates had IPO support, so that only one of them could win (FL-13). The other exception was in MI-124, where Rudy Hobbs, who was backed by the Sandy Levin IPO, lost to Brenda Lawrence, who was backed by a group, EMILY’s List. But the overall record of success for party coordination is impressive.

Yet parties cannot be entirely credited for the success of the candidates they support. As we have said, stronger candidates are more likely to attract party (and group) support than weak ones. But it would be foolish to maintain that the benefits that parties provide – which may include scores or hundreds of volunteers, fund raising assistance, cues to voters, and field clearing or reduction – do not also make an important difference. Both candidates and their supporters bring something to their relationship.

We also observed a handful of cases in which non-party actors coordinated with one another and saw their preferred candidate win. One example, described in the case studies below, is a union-led union coalition that united behind Brendan Boyle in PA-13 despite the presence of three other pro-union candidates in the race. Another example is the coordination of construction, mechanical and electrical contractors in LA-6 under the leadership of Lane Grigsby, as described in the text.

As documented in the case studies below, we observed party or group coordinated support for one or more candidates in 31 of our 53 WOSP primaries, no coordinated support in 20, and too little information for classification in two. Coordinated support by a party or group was the most common form of anchoring in our set of cases and, from appearances, the most effective.

Monetary support. Another way for a group to anchor a campaign is for its peak organization or its members to contribute \$250,000 or more to a candidate. Of course, most candidates need substantially more than \$250,00 to win a primary, so why do we choose this particular amount as indicating viability?

Our reasoning begins with the observation that candidates who can raise \$250,000 early in a campaign are usually able to raise substantially more. If the additional money is as much as \$250,000, candidates will be able to spend more than what the median second-place finisher, which is \$433,00; if the additional fundraising is as much as \$500,000, the candidates will be able to spend more than the median first place finisher, which is \$715,000. In light of these figures, \$250,000 is not a small amount of money. We also recalled three viable candidates¹ who set roughly \$250,000 in fundraising in the first campaign reporting period as an amount

¹ Tommy Moll in AR-4, \$260,000; Tom Emmer in MN-5, \$200,000; and Gary Palmer in AL-6, \$250,000.

that would not only establish their viability but deter other candidates from running. Finally, we knew that some – and sometimes most – of what candidates raise cannot be traced to its group source from FEC data, so that \$250,000 in traceable group money is likely to be an understatement of the true amount of group support.

We acknowledge that our \$250,000 cutoff is rough and arbitrary. We considered developing a sliding scale for viability that would depend on contextual factors, such as how much other candidates were spending. But in the end we opted for simplicity.

Of the 43 candidates whom we classified as having an anchor – recall that six candidates were classified as having no anchor and four were set as missing – 16 were classified on the basis of the \$250,000 fundraising criterion. This includes two cases that were problematic, as we describe immediately below.

Measurement of group contributions from FEC data is straightforward in some cases but difficult in others. Pharmacist Buddy Carter in GA-1 is one of the easier cases. He received about \$250,000 from individuals who were either pharmacists or worked for pharmacy businesses, \$70,000 from the Political Action Committees of pharmacy businesses, and another \$100,000 in independent expenditures from pharmacy associations; together these pharmacy-related contributions amounted to about 44 percent of Carter’s fundraising.

We were able to straightforwardly measure the support of individual pharmacists because FEC reports include “pharmacist” as an occupation code and the employer of donors. Group support for Garret Graves, the maritime administrator from LA-6, was more difficult but still manageable to calculate. For while employment in the “Louisiana maritime sector” is not an FEC occupation, it was still identifiable from FEC data. For example, we classified a campaign contribution to Graves from someone working for an oil drilling company in a Gulf state as working in the maritime sector. Likewise for a contribution from someone working in the shipping or tourist business. By this general method we were able to use standard FEC occupation and employer codes to identify anchoring support for Graves and for several other candidates whose groups were not directly represented in FEC codes.

However, this approach to measuring group sources of monetary support seemed to us inadequate for two candidates whose campaigns appeared from qualitative evidence to be

anchored in the monetary contributions of a group, but a group whose members were not identifiable in FEC reports by their occupation or employer.

One was Bradley Byrne in AL-1, a lawyer who, according to two credible sources, had the support of the district's business establishment. It would do nothing to validate business as a potential anchor of Byrne's campaign for us to show that he raised more than \$250,000 from individuals who worked for businesses. To identify anchoring, we needed evidence of a more specific relationship between candidate and donor.

The second difficult case was Katherine Clark in MA-5. Clark featured her record of working for women's rights and received endorsements from three feminist organizations. It is likely that Clark's fundraising pitch to individual donors appealed to her record and perhaps also her endorsements from the three groups, but (unlike, e.g., the case of Carter and pharmacists) FEC data do not reveal whether donors were members of feminist groups.

We might have declared the Byrnes and Clark cases to be NA, but concluded that, despite the unhelpfulness of the FEC data, the pattern of qualitative evidence in the Byrne and Clark campaigns merited classifying them as group-anchored. We have flagged these cases so that the reader can scrutinize them in the case studies below.

Volunteer support. Our field interviews and newspaper study turned up evidence of substantial volunteer campaign effort in 17 of our 53 WOSP primaries. For reasons we discuss below, this may be a significant undercount. The 17 instances fall into two sharply different categories. Ten involve volunteer activity closely linked to the official activity of a group or party. For example, the McLaughlin-led union coalition provided Brendan Boyle in PA-13 with his main volunteer force. Likewise, volunteer support for Tom MacArthur in NJ-3 was organized by two Republican Party committees. Both the McLaughlin-led union and the New Jersey parties supplied their endorsed candidates with more than simply volunteer support. For these and similar cases, we subsume volunteer support as part of the official group effort and classify the campaigns as anchored in the group rather than in the volunteers it provides.

In contrast, Reverend Jody Hice in GA-10 recruited many of his volunteers from his church congregation, but did so without involvement by the church as an organization. Indeed, he

resigned his position as lead minister before launching his campaign in order to underscore the independence of his campaign from the church.

We count only cases like Hice's as indicative of group anchoring. The criteria for such classification are that 1) the volunteers share a group affiliation, 2) they make individual decisions about whether to work for their preferred candidate, and 3) they provide a substantial amount of support. The volunteers need not be the bulk of the campaign's effort, but only a large enough amount to confer viability. Five campaigns met these criteria and two, though presently unclassified due to weakness of present evidence, are candidates to meet them, depending on further research.

The identification and measurement of volunteer campaign support is perhaps the weakest major component of this study. The first is the inherent difficulty of measuring it. It generates no official record, as with monetary contributions and the FEC, and no clear event or action, as with the vote of a party committee to indicate coordinated support. Well-informed observers, such as political journalists, may be aware of volunteer activity but unable to judge its magnitude. Only well-placed sources within or very close to campaigns are likely to have the necessary information and their reports may be exaggerated, perhaps for reason of social desirability.

How, then, can we identify the amount of volunteer support necessary to anchor a campaign? The use of \$250,000 as the minimum monetary support needed to convey viability was, we acknowledged, based on subjective judgment, but at least the amount was clear. We cannot specify a comparable fixed minimum for anchoring volunteer support. The best we can do is to be transparent in the basis of our classifications, as we try to be in the case studies below.

The second and quite different reason for the weak measurement of volunteer activity is that we were slow to recognize its importance. Volunteers were not on our radar as we began the study and only gradually became a subject of regular inquiry. Yet by the midpoint of the study, and especially in interviews conducted after the main period of field study in 2013-14, we made volunteer activity a high priority for investigation. In no race did we have the resources to investigate the role of volunteers in the campaigns of all candidates or even all top

candidates, and most often we were able to assess only the campaigns of the winning candidates, who are the focus of our measurement of anchoring. These assessments are, in every positive case, based on information from sources at the level of campaign manager, candidate, or top party operative, but we do not have them for as many campaigns as we would like.

Expertise. Both the Democratic and Republican party organizations routinely provide trainings and consultation to candidates in their primaries, but do so under norms that limit favoritism. To the best of our knowledge, only EMILY's List [EL] provides such support to preferred candidates and, like the two parties, the organization provides basic guidance to all candidates within their mandate, that is, all pro-choice women candidates.

For candidates that EL endorses and helps to fund, however, the organization goes much further, assigning as needed both general as well as specialized advisors in subjects like fundraising, polling, and strategy. A source told us that, for candidates it endorses and contributes money to, EL staff routinely reviews key campaign documents and decisions. Staff also visit the campaigns to look for such problems as “a campaign manager who's not speaking to a finance director, or direct mail that doesn't drop on time, or the messaging in the direct mail not reflecting the research, or the targeting of the TV or the direct mail not reflecting the science that [is] in the voter file.” EL staff are “invited to all campaign conference calls... privy to all their decision making...

... so if they [the campaign] are deciding, ‘do I put this television ad on the air, do I put this other ad on the air,’ [EL staff are] on the phone with them. In some cases the consultant will call ... and say ‘can you [EL staff] convince the candidate that this ad should air...’” EL staff “are a force on these calls.”

The source added that it is a requirement that EMILY's List candidates take seriously the advice the organization proffers.

The campaign summary for Brenda Lawrence in MI-14 below provides further information on the role EL can play in campaigns it supports.

The expert advice that EL provides is probably not, by itself, sufficient to convey viability on a campaign. But in combination with other benefits of EL support – direct expenditures, access to EL donors – expert advice is a substantial benefit. Our subjective judgment in assessing anchoring is that, in cases in which EL makes its endorsement early in the campaign and supports it with an independent expenditure, the expert guidance that comes with the endorsement is worth \$100,000. In cases in which EL made a late endorsement along with an independent expenditure, we assume that its expert support also arrived late and therefore had a value of only \$50,000. These two values are separate from any independent expenditures or fundraising support that may also have been given. Thus, if EL made an independent expenditure of \$150,000 for a candidate, we will add \$100,000 to its level of support for that candidate to reflect the value of the expertise that EL provides in such cases. This would then bring the total monetary value of EL’s support to \$250,000, which would qualify EL as an anchor of the campaign.

In a few cases, EL endorsed a candidate but provided no financial support. These seemed to be cases, as with Debbie Dingell in MI-12, that the woman candidate was likely to win without EL help. We assume that, absent financial support, expert support was not provided either.

3. Classifications

Based on the criteria described above and the case studies presented in section C below, we classify the winning candidate in our 53 WOSP primaries as follows:

	Anchor	
Yes	40	75%
Probably yes	3	6%
No anchor	6	11%
Not classified	4	8%
Total	53	100%

By this count, a large majority of winning candidates anchored their campaigns in a single group or a party organization. It thus makes sense to say that anchoring was the norm among winners of WOSP primaries in the period of our study.

The text of the paper provides abundant examples of what anchoring looks like. So what about the six cases that fail to conform to the norm? These cases, which may be regarded as candidate-centered, are distributed as follows:

- Two self-financing millionaires won primaries in Louisiana 6 and Florida 19 without need for outside financing
- Two veteran politicians with wide connections financed their campaigns from multiple groups, no one of which gave an amount that came close to our threshold levels of support for anchoring. These were Mimi Walters from Orange County, California and Don Beyer from Alexandria, Virginia.
- Mark Sanford, a former two term governor of South Carolina, won raised money from a variety of sources and spent more than any of his 16 opponents.
- Bradley Zaun, a veteran state legislator who won a congressional nomination four years earlier, finished first with only 25 percent of the vote in a six-person field.

Setting aside the two millionaire candidates, the four exceptions show is that it is possible to succeed in a House primary without a solo anchor, provided the candidate begins the race with prior standing or assets. Yet for the majority of candidates who lack such advantage, an anchoring group appears nearly essential.

The four cases that remain unclassified reflect lack of information to make a confident assignment. We do, however, have information about them which suggests that the winning campaign may well have been anchored. We are continuing to investigate these cases and hope eventually to be able to assign classifications to at least some of them.

For the majority of cases that are or probably are anchored, 47 percent are anchored in an individual group, such as a union or profession or business sector, and the rest are anchored in some form of political party. The following table gives the breakdown:

Types of anchor		
Local party (e.g., NJ-3)	9	17%
National party (e.g. CA-31)	5	8%
IPO (e.g., Levin group, MI-14)	4	9%
Group (e.g., union, chamber)	25	47%
Candidate-centered	6	11%
Not ascertained	4	8%
	53	100%

The bases for these classifications are provided either in the text of the paper or in the case studies presented below.

4. Case studies

Alabama 1st district

Republican nominee: **Bradley Byrne**

Method: Party primary with runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: State and local business community (group)

Coordination: National party (Cantor)

Faction: Byrne, establishment; Young, insurgent.

[This is an expansion of material that appeared in the text.]

Bradley Byrne was not shy about being viewed as a business candidate. He told us in an interview that was recruited by business people for the first two electoral offices he held, the state school board and the state Senate. His most important work prior to running for Congress was as reform chancellor of the state's two-year college system, in which position he rooted out corruption and pressed for more vocational education. "Most of the business people really liked that," he said, "because they thought 'Here's a guy that going to get our needs with regard to workforce development.' And I am a guy that gets that for them."

Following defeat in a 2010 run for governor, Byrne returned to private life but remained involved with business organizations. As he told us, he had been a member of the board of the Mobile Chamber of Commerce, the Eastern Shore chamber, and the Baldwin County chamber and had worked regularly with the state equivalent, the Alabama Business Council. "So these [business] relationships weren't just relationships I cultivated during the campaign, I had been cultivating those relationships for years and years and years," he said.

Our sources likewise saw Byrne as a business candidate. "[Byrne] was always part of the Chamber of Commerce crowd," said one of our sources. [AL6-2. 39:50] "The corporate community knows Bradley Byrne, likes Bradley Byrne, that's been in place for years," said another. [AL6-8 24:10].

Organized business was a major boon to his congressional campaign. Business PACs contributed about \$230,000 to his primary and runoff campaigns and the national Chamber of Commerce made an additional independent expenditure of \$200,000 in the runoff. The initiative for the National Chamber of Commerce expenditure came not from Byrne but from Alabama business leaders. As Byrne explained:

I had a previous relationship with the national chamber, particularly through our state chamber, which is called the Business Council of Alabama. The US chamber got involved [in the congressional campaign] as much because the folks running the business council of Alabama said you [national chamber] need to get involved in this race. Now they [national chamber] did do their homework, they didn't just do it blindly, but boy when they came in they came in a big way, and I really appreciated it that they did that.

The bulk of the business PAC contributions, Byrne said, was likewise due more to the initiative of his supporters – in this case, Republican House Majority Leader Eric Cantor – than to his own request for help.

Eric got directly involved with his political team and literally went to some of the national [business] PACs and said, ‘I know you don’t usually do this, but we think this race is so important, because we go from getting a guy we want to getting a guy we really don’t want, and so lot of those PACs that gave money to me in the runoff I never talked to, I never even met. I spent the first several weeks in congress meeting them for the first time so I could personally thank them. It was just very unusual situation where they were jumping in both into a race that they did not intend to get involved in and didn’t really know the candidate they were supporting.

If we combine Byrne’s \$230,000 from business PACs with the \$200,000 expenditure by the national chamber, we can say that his monetary support from business easily met our \$250,000 for anchoring. However, Byrne stated that the bulk of his business PAC support was due to the Republican Majority Leader, Eric Cantor, which in our accounting is party support. So did Byrne’s campaign have sufficient business support to count as anchored by business?

From FEC data alone, the answer is no. Byrne got a large fraction of his contributions from business people, including many CEOs and company presidents, but unless we can show that these business contributors were from the particular communities with whom Byrne had worked – as we could, e.g., for pharmacist Carter and maritime administrator Graves – we do not count them as business supporters. Because the national chamber’s \$200,000 contribution was instigated by Bryne’s Alabama business supporters, we can count it toward our anchoring criterion, but not much other business support.

But if we take account of the comments of our sources, plus Byrne’s own comments about his relationship with business over his whole political careers, there is little doubt that Byrne’s congressional campaign should be classified as anchoring in business.

So to conclude: We are judging that Bryne got at least \$250,000 from the business community with which he had worked, but the basis of that judgment includes more information than what FEC data alone provides.

With support from both the US Chamber of Commerce and the party’s Majority Leader, Byrne is an establishment candidate. His main opponent was Dean Young, who said during the campaign that he hoped to become “a Ted Cruz Congressman” – where Cruz, of course, is a leading insurgent within the GOP. Though Young got little support from insurgent groups, this statement marks him as an insurgent candidate.

Alabama 6th district

Republican nominee: **Gary Palmer**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: Ideological network (group)

Coordination: None

Factions: Palmer, insurgent; DeMarco, establishment

As described in the text, Palmer was the founder, chief fundraiser, and head policy wonk for the Alabama Policy Institute (API), a conservative think tank dating to the 1980s. Palmer announced his congressional candidacy three weeks prior to the end of the FEC's fall reporting period and set a goal of raising \$250,000 in this window as a means of impressing observers that his campaign would be viable. He achieved this goal, with "nearly all" of his money coming from regular API donors.

With backing from Club for Growth, Palmer was an insurgent.

His principal opponent, Paul DeMarco, was a cautious conservative. According to our sources, he worked tirelessly to help out business and other organized groups on non-controversial projects. Eight corporate PACs contributed \$37,000 to Palmer, while 71 contributed \$235,000 to DeMarco. This level of PAC support is not sufficient to classify his campaign as anchored in business – though by comments from interview sources it was – it is sufficient to indicate that DeMarco was an establishment candidate.

Arizona 7th district

Democratic nominee: **Ruben Gallegos**

Method: Traditional primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: Food workers union (group)

Coordination: Food workers union

Faction: Top two both establishment

The Democratic primary in the majority Latino 7th House district of Arizona began with two union-backed candidates, Ruben Gallegos, who was supported by the United Culinary and Food Workers (UCFW), the largest union in the district, and Steve Gallardo, president of the smaller but still important American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The third major candidate was Mary Rose Wilcox, a County Supervisor and civil rights leader. All three had progressive credentials, but Ruben Gallego was stronger in one key area – voter mobilization and turnout. The 7th district was solidly Democratic, but contributed little to Democratic margins in statewide contests due to low turnout among Latinos. Our sources agreed that Ruben Gallego was an effective organizer who might make progress on increasing Latino turnout, and this won him significant support among activists and leaders whom we interviewed. But it was likely that if the two union candidates, Gallego and Gallardo, ran against Wilcox, it would split the union vote and result in a win for Wilcox and continuation of the of low turnout tradition.

This led to intense pressure on Gallardo to quit the race. From one side, a group of senior community leaders met with him and urged him to withdraw. From the other, a person associated with the Gallego campaign threatened Gallardo supporters with loss of public contracts unless they changed sides. Gallardo himself was threatened with exposure of his homosexuality, according to two sources. The AFSCME rank-and-file voted to endorse their president, Gallardo, for the House seat, but under pressure from Gallegos supporters, the executive council reversed the decision and endorsed Gallegos.

With Gallardo still insisting he would run, a representative of the Food Workers offered a deal that was reported to us by three sources: If Gallardo would withdraw from the House primary and endorse Gallegos, the UCFW would support him for Wilcox's open seat on the Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County. Gallardo accepted the offer, switched to the supervisors race, and with UCFW help won a seat on the board. Gallegos then beat Wilcox by 13 percentage points in the House primary, a margin that might not have withstood a Gallardo candidacy splitting the union vote.

The straightforward conclusion from these events is that the United Culinary and Food Workers both anchored Gallego's campaign and coordinated with another union to shape the field to his benefit.

Both Wilcox and Gallegos were liberal Democrats, but within the mainstream of their parties. Wilcox, for example, was endorsed by the U.S. Women's Chamber of Commerce; Gallegos received an award from a local chamber of commerce, according to a disappointed supporter of Gallardo (AZ-7_3 AFSCME I 16:30). A progressive activist whom we interviewed expressed deep disappointment with both candidates (AZ-7_11)

Arkansas 2nd district

Republican nominee: **French Hill**

Method: Primary with runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent in primary

Number of primary candidates: 3

Anchor: Finance and development sector (group)

Coordination: None observed

Factions: Top two both establishment; third place candidate insurgent.

In AR-2R, the winning candidate, French Hill, was a Treasury official in the first Bush presidency, the founder of a regional bank, president of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce, and the subject of speculation as a future Republican candidate for governor. As a banker, he had been at the forefront of business ventures in Arkansas for 25 years. Just ahead of his House campaign, Hill led a lobbying effort that convinced the Arkansas legislature to spend \$1.1 billion for a state-backed steel development. Speaking of the chamber of commerce, one of our interview sources said that Hill is “ ‘one of them’ in a very personal go-to-dinner kind of way ...” Hill’s network of associates became his fundraising base.

Consistent with these observations, calculations from FEC data indicate that Hill received about \$700,000 in campaign contributions from groups or individuals in banking, investment, or development, which was 80 percent of all money he raised. Separately, we asked a source in Hill’s campaign what percent of Hill’s contributions had come from someone who either worked with him on a project or for someone in the network of a person who had worked with him; the source’s estimate was 80 to 90 percent. Neither of Hill’s two opponents got as much as \$10,000 from this class of donor. From the moment the curtain came up on this race, Hill was at the head of the pack and he never appeared to be threatened.

Yet as a banker in a state with populist traditions, Hill was not without vulnerabilities. In 2007 he published an article supporting the Troubled Asset Relief Program of the Bush administration and he spearheaded an effort for a tax increase in Little Rock for public safety and infrastructure improvements. “He’s a banker that doesn’t think *you* pay enough taxes” commented a leading anti-establishment operative to whom we spoke. “In the right hands, that knife will cut.” But, this source continued, Hill was lucky that neither of his opponents had the political temperament to run an effective populist campaign against him.

Based on this evidence, we assess that Hill anchored his successful campaign in high end business and development circles in his state. We turned up no evidence of party activity or of political coordination in this case.

Arkansas requires runoffs unless the leading candidate gets at least 50 percent of the primary vote. Hill got 54 percent.

As a former president of the local chamber of commerce, Hill was an establishment candidate. The second-place finished was Ann Clemmer, a state legislator whom one source described as a

middle of the road Republican and another as always going along with what business wanted. A third candidate, Colonel Conrad Reynolds aggressively advanced Tea Party positions in public events and, according to our sources, had support from his local Tea Party chapter. Following our sources, we classify Clemmer as establishment and Reynolds as insurgent.

Arkansas 4th district

Republican nominee: **Bruce Westerman**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Garland County Tea Party (group)

Coordination: None

Factions: Both candidates insurgent

The 4th district is physically large, mostly rural, and relatively poor. Until 2012 it was represented by conservative Democrats, but in that year Tom Cotton – who grew up in Arkansas but had gone to school in the east, served in the Army, and worked for a prestigious DC consulting firm – returned home and won the seat. But after just seven months in office, Cotton announced that he would run for the Senate in 2014, thus opening the seat.

One of the entrants was another returning native son. Tommy Moll had grown up in Arkansas, gone east for school, earned degrees in law and public policy, and established himself as an investment analyst in the New York area. But he may always have planned to run for Congress from his home state because he voted absentee before returning home to announce at age 31 his candidacy for the House of Representatives. Moll was little known in political circles but made a big impression by raising \$260,000 in campaign contributions in the first six weeks of his campaign. Only seven percent of this total came from donors with zip codes inside the district, according to FEC data. Said a source:

When you heard Tommy Moll, well, everybody said who's that? And I think that, pretty quickly, his fundraising numbers... I mean, anytime somebody shows up with fundraising numbers like that, you immediately start taking them pretty seriously. ... There was a huge element of surprise there. [AR-19, 35:50]

Another surprise arrived when the influential conservative blog RedState ran a column endorsing Moll and attacking his opponent, House Majority Leader Bruce Westerman, as a closet supporter of Obamacare. Most of the Arkansans we interviewed considered the attack unfair and were angered by it. Some were further put off by Moll's failure to get to know them. "He's been kind of a stealth candidate, he's not made himself available to the press for extended interviews, really kind of quietly just done what he's done, doesn't advertise where he's gonna be, doesn't return requests for comment," said a leading journalist [AR-2. 38:00]

Moll couldn't keep up the torrid fundraising of the first weeks of his campaign. A non-campaign observer told us that it would require \$750,000 to win but Moll ended up able to spend only \$510,000. The second candidate, however, was able to raise even less money. Although Westerman was Majority Leader in the state Assembly, he raised only \$300,000. The reason for this lack of success, as mentioned in the text, was Westerman's lack of personal relationships with the Republican donor community.

The two campaigns pursued different campaign strategies . With weak roots in the district and hence disadvantage in recruiting volunteers, Moll prioritized TV advertising, spending over half of his total budget, nearly \$300,000, on TV. Although this may have been his best option, it was risky. The sprawling and sparsely populated 4th district had no media markets of its own, so its various parts were served by different markets. This meant that the campaign needed to pay for ads that were broadcast to only parts of the 4th district.

Westerman, with a much smaller campaign budget, spent only about \$40,000 on TV and prioritized volunteer support. And here he got important help from Americans for Prosperity (AFP), an entity supported by the Koch brothers, David and Charles. AFP ran voter education and political organizing programs in 30 to 35 U.S. states in the period of our study (Sockpol and Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). The AFP's purpose was to support conservative activist networks that would act for themselves in politics. The AFP came to Arkansas in 2012 and by 2014 had a six-person professional staff disseminating information and holding training events across the state on such topics as how to do a press conference and use email lists.

The Arkansas Tea Party had been “a kettle that didn't whistle” in the 2010 elections (Dowdle, 2012), but a well-informed source told us that the arrival of the AFP made a big difference to Tea Party organizations in the state.

AFP has been consistent in keeping these people [Tea Party] educated with talking points. Keeping them actively engaged in social media. In 2012, AFP got involved in two or three races to get the Tea Party engaged and were effective. AFP is careful not to manage, but to channel their intensity into issues both care about. [AR-7. 26:40]

One of the Tea Party chapters aided by the AFP was in Garland County, the largest of the 33 counties in the 4th district. This was good news for Westerman, whose home was in Garland County. As our source commented:

I think one of the most important groups in the 4th district race will be the Garland County Tea Party group. [It] was very effective in [Tom Cotton's] primary.... I think Bruce [Westerman] has solidified the Garland County TP support.. [and] it's going to be a very effective organization. [AR-7. 9:40, 14:40]

Asked to estimate how many Tea Party members would be active in the 4th district campaign, the source said:

At the peak, let's just say 72 hours before election day, at the height of intensity for Tea Party and average republicans [i.e, voters] before the primary, I'd say you probably get three or four hundred Tea Party activists that are involved in door knocking or phone calls or stuffing envelopes or whatever all across the fourth district... [AR-7. 26:50]

This source, a major player in Arkansas politics, was interviewed just as the House campaign was getting under way in November, 2013. In later interviews, three other sources confirmed, though in much less detail, that the AFP and the Tea Party were important sources of support

for Westerman. One of the sources was Peter Somerville, campaign manager for Moll. In an interview in 2022, he said that although Moll made a strong play for support of the Garland County Tea Party, it remained solid for Westerman and was, as he put it, the “nucleus” of Westerman’s campaign.

In light of all this, we judge the Garland County Tea Party to have been an anchor of Westerman’s campaign. With this core support, a PAC endorsement by the Family Research Council, negligible business support (only \$7,500 from business PACs), and his reputedly close relations with the Arkansas chapter of Americans for Prosperity, Westerman should be viewed as an insurgent candidate. Moll, with an endorsement from the Madison Project and anemic support from business PACs (only \$9,500), likewise has the markings of an insurgent candidate.

One other note. Much has been written about the influence of the Koch Brothers in American politics. We found little evidence of such influence except in the AR-4 Republican primary. Both candidates in this two-candidate race had campaign managers with connections to Koch network programs, but the Koch network provided no money – at least so far as we could see – to either campaign in this low spending race and only indirect support to Westerman, as described above. This pattern is consistent with a study of the Koch network by Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez (2016).

California 11th district

Democratic nominee: **Mark DeSaulnier**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 4 Dems., 1 Rep., 2 other

Anchor: National party elites

Coordination: National party elites

Faction: DeSaulnier, establishment; Sudduth, insurgent

In the primary election for this safely Democratic open seat, Mark DeSaulnier got 85 percent of the Democratic vote, with the remaining share scattered among three minor local politicians. The lopsided vote was in one sense unsurprising: DeSaulnier received all of the prestige endorsements in the race and was the only candidate who could afford TV advertising. But why did no other strong Democrats run for this safe Democratic seat? Two well-regarded female state legislators represented parts of the congressional district and had allies predisposed to support them. But these candidates chose instead to compete for the state senate seat DeSaulnier was giving up.²

The explanation, as several sources told us, was that “the party” – meaning organized labor, state legislative leaders, the retiring House incumbent, and “Nancy” [i.e., Democratic House leader Nancy Pelosi] – wanted DeSaulnier. He had been a hard-working member of the state legislature, taken unpopular votes because party leaders asked for them, and so earned the right to move up. Said a source:

There was definitely a conspiracy of the party elders to say, ‘OK, we owe this one to Mark....’ Mark has been good with the unions... Mark is just a really good politician... nobody hates him ... the field was cleared out.

What, we asked our sources, would have happened if a top politician had tried to run against the party consensus? The politician would have been unable to raise money, they said.

The motive for coordination in this case was to reward a valued party colleague; the means was the capacity to limit fundraising by potential opponents. DeSaulnier’s dominant campaign was based on strong support of party insiders and their union allies.

With the party establishment behind him, DeSaulnier got 84 percent of the vote for Democratic candidates in California’s Top Two primary, with his nearest opponent, Cheryl Sudduth getting only seven percent. Her endorsement by the Black Panther Party suggests that she was an insurgent.

² These candidates were both women and one had previously run for a House nomination. Because EMILY’s List is typically aggressive in the promotion of women candidates, we were surprised that it did not get involved in this race. Our speculation is that it stayed out because (as noted below) Nancy Pelosi supported DeSaulnier. We mention this speculation as an example of the kind of string pulling that, even if it had occurred, would be very hard for researchers like us to learn about.

California 25th district

Republican nominee: **Steve Knight**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 2 Dems., 5 Rep., 1 other

Anchor: Local office holders (IPO)

Coordination: Informal party organization

Factions: Top two both establishment.

The California 25th, a suburban district north of Los Angeles, was represented for two decades by Buck McKeon, who in the later part of his career was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and was therefore an important player in national politics.³ But local politicians were less than thrilled by McKeon's advance in national politics. In their perception, McKeon was often missing in action when they needed help from Washington to solve their local problems.

When McKeon retired in 2014, no politician from the district stepped forward as a replacement. This left an opening for a politician from a neighboring district to parachute into the CA-25 race. This politician, Tony Strickland, had strong connections in Washington and used them to raise more than a million dollars from sources mainly outside the district.

Strickland thus looked to politicians in the district like another representative who would neglect local interests in order to play in national politics. In this situation, five local office holders met for dinner to decide what should be done. According to two sources, one of whom was present at the dinner, none of the five politicians was interested in running for Congress, but they agreed that one of the five must oppose Strickland and that it should be Steve Knight, who was then a member of the state Senate. Both sources, as well as a blog account of the campaign, indicated that Knight had no plan to run prior to the dinner meeting.

Although CA-25 leaned to the Republican Party, the district was more competitive between the two parties than most others in our study. One might therefore expect that party leaders would want to nominate an ideological moderate who could appeal to swing voters from the Democratic side. And that may have been the motive of Strickland's supporters. But our sources said that the five diners cared most of all about representation of local interests. These local interests, moreover, came through for Knight in the first and second phases of California's top two top system, powering grass roots campaigns that helped him win election to Congress despite being outspent by Strickland about five to one. We therefore assess that Knight's campaign was anchored not by financial contributions, but by an ad hoc Republican IPO and aligned conservative activists and was, accordingly, the candidate of a local establishment. The goal of his sponsors was not to change their party but to secure representation for their community in Washington. Strickland was, compared to Knight, a moderate on most issues, but his positions were standard for Republicans.⁴

³ This discussion relies on "Analysis of 2014 CA-25 Race" by UCLA undergraduate Christopher Leach in PS 191C in Winter quarter 2017. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix.

⁴ See Campaign Themes: 2014." https://ballotpedia.org/Tony_Strickland

California 31st district

Democratic nominee: **Pete Aguilar**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 4 Dems., 3 Reps.

Anchor: DCCC (national party)

Coordination: DCCC

Factions: Aguilar establishment; Reyes insurgent.

The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee coordinated support for Aguilar in the district, discouraged other candidates from running, helped him raise money, intervened for him with a late Independent Expenditure when it appeared he had fallen behind the two leading Republicans, and may have been partly responsible for recruiting him. Though most DCCC support was non-monetary, it was clearly a major prop of his campaign.

Eloise Reyes Gomez, the runner up, was backed by EMILY's List and from the progressive wing of her party – and so twice an insurgent.

California 33th district

Democratic nominee: **Ted Lieu**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 10 Dems., 3 Reps., 5 other

Anchor: Asian American donors (group)

Coordination: None observed


Factions: Top two candidates both establishment.

Ten Democrats, three Republicans, a Libertarian, a Green, and three Independents entered California's All-party primary for the open seat in the heavily left-leaning 33rd district – a total of 18 candidates in all.

Republicans voters were heavily outnumbered in the 33rd district, but the GOP might still have won the seat if Republican candidates finished first and second in the primary, thereby creating a runoff between two Republicans in the fall election. This scenario had recently played out in nearby CA-31 (see previous case), but the CA-33 race broke differently. The best financed Republican finished first with 22 percent of the primary vote, but the other Republican candidates finished in sixth and seventh place, thereby leaving the number two slot to the other party.

The other party, however, was in some disarray. Two well-regarded Democratic office holders raised the money necessary for strong campaigns, but so did three novices. The race for number two in the primary – and likely number one in the fall runoff -- was up for grabs.

The figure below, which we include to organize the large field, summarizes vote shares and



campaign spending amounts for the 10 Democrats, a left-leaning independent (Williamson), and the Green candidate. The cluster of points at the lower left refers to candidates who raised who little or no money and got almost no votes.

Each of the remaining five has some interest. David Kanuth had no identifiable political standing but managed nonetheless to raise \$750,000 through cold calls to former Harvard classmates and fellow lawyers. He is thus a conspicuous exception to our generalization that it is hard to raise significant campaign money outside of a vetting and vouching network. His electoral fate also suggests what money alone is worth in House primaries.

Matt Miller and Marianne Williamson had what might be called celebrity followings – the former as a commentator on National Public Radio and the latter as a successful author, motivational speaker, and (as the *Washington Post* put it) “spiritual guru.” Neither had ever run for political office, but in different ways, Miller and Williamson were both good fits to the fevered political culture of parts of the westside LA district. Both were able to raise significant campaign money and Miller also got the coveted endorsement from the Los Angeles *Times*. Both also did well in the election, but slightly less well than did the two Democratic office holders.

The Democratic office holders each had imposing strengths. Wendy Greuel was a city council member who had recently run in a hard-fought election for mayor of LA, finishing first in the primary but second in the runoff. She had substantial support from organized labor and from EMILY’s List, which made a \$147,000 independent expenditure on her behalf.

Ted Lieu was a former city councilman from a medium-sized city and the incumbent state Senator from a district that largely overlapped the 33rd congressional district. (In California, state Senate districts have slightly more people than congressional districts; moreover, both districts are drawn by a citizen’s redistricting commission that emphasizes common community values.) Lieu was thus in the position of appealing to many voters who had already voted for him for a different office.

Another advantage for Lieu is that the 33rd district was 13.3 percent Asian American, a figure not far below the 18.8 percent of the vote Lieu won in the all-party primary. We don’t know the share of Asian Americans who voted for Lieu, but his identifiably Asian name was likely an important factor in his success.

Our account of House primaries has emphasized group support, but elite level groups rather than co-ethnic voting groups. But elite level group influence was present as well. Not only the 33rd congressional district, but Los Angeles county as a whole, is about 13 percent Asian American and as such one of the largest concentrations of Asian Americans in the country. It has a rich assortment of social, political and cultural institutions associated with a half dozen or more different Asian American communities, including Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Vietnamese, Indian, and Pakistani. Los Angeles is also home to several national Asian American newspapers,

usually focused on a particular slice of the larger ethnic community. We lack specific information on Lieu's relationship with this general Asian American community, but were told that he stayed in close touch with his constituents groups, presumably including Asian Americans.

The evidence most pertinent to our concerns is FEC data showing that Lieu raised about \$290,000 from individuals with Asian American names and another \$13,000 from Asian American Political Action Committees. Most of the individual contributions were from instate (84 percent) but outside the district (76 percent). Hence the total of contributions from Asian American sources exceeds our criterion of group anchoring. [I'm hoping that an interview with Lieu will provide more information here.]

We acknowledge that, as an incumbent state senator from a district that largely overlapped CA-33 and the bearer of an Asian American name in a district with a substantial number of co-ethnic voters, Lieu would probably have been viable even without the money he fundraised from Asian American sources. Yet even with a built-in advantage, Lieu edged out Gruel by just under 2,500 votes, so his campaign must have been critical too. The \$304,000 Lieu raised from Asian Americans, which was 34 percent of all of his campaign cash, was quite possibly pivotal.

Lieu and Greuel were both standard representatives of Democratic establishment values— with one major exception. Lieu had gone along with his party caucus in Sacramento to support a constitutional amendment that would have allowed affirmative action in college admissions. This position, however, is unpopular among some Asian Americans, who feel that affirmative action reduces their chances. When the campaign shone a light on Lieu's support for the amendment, he changed his position, losing the support of some liberals who had previously backed him. If there was an insurgent in the race, it was Williamson, whose call for political change through personal inner change placed her outside the Democratic mainstream. However she finished third in the race.

California 35th district

Democratic nominee: **Norma Torres**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: Unions (group)

Coordination: Unions

Factions: Top two both establishment

Norma Torres spent just \$170,000 on her primary in the open 35th congressional district of California, the second lowest total for any winning candidate in a competitive primary. But this was five times more than her nearest competitor and enough to get her 67 percent of the vote in a primary against three other Democrats.⁵ The question for this race is not why Torres won the primary in a landslide, but how she gained such a big spending advantage.

Torres' rise in politics is closely tied to organized labor. The district is heavily Latino and generally unprosperous, which leaves unions the most important – and perhaps only – regular player in Democratic primaries. The district's two major labor councils – one centered in Los Angeles and the other in San Bernardino-Riverside – each have a formal endorsement process. Individual unions screen candidates and propose them to the labor council which then interviews them. In voting on endorsements, the councils appear to practice a norm of deference to each union in its domain. As a union president explained:

If it's a school board race, I'm usually going to say 'I'm probably not the best person to come to first. You should reach out to your teachers or you should reach out to [the teachers union],' Because at the end of the day I'm going to defer to them out of respect. Just like I'm going to ask them to defer to me on issues that are more important to me.

It is not clear how this norm would apply in a House nomination that would be of concern to all unions, but both the Los Angeles and San Bernardino-Riverside labor councils endorsed – we would say, coordinated on -- Torres. Following the endorsement, 15 California and national union PACs contributed a total of \$50,000 to Torres. Most of these unions probably also communicated their preference to members and canvassed for Torres along with other candidates on their ticket. The unions were, moreover, prepared to spend more, but, as a union president told us, felt it unnecessary because Torres had no strong opponent. [CA-35_6, 1:35].

When measured solely in monetary terms, anchoring requires a contribution of \$250,000. But in a district in which unions were the dominant source of campaign support, contributed as much money to Torres as they felt was necessary for her to win, and cued their members to support her with their votes, their coordinated support likely deterred other challengers and

⁵ No Republican candidates entered the All-Party primary for the 35th district.

thereby made her victory high likely. This combination of monetary and non-monetary support meets our basic criterion of anchoring and counts as an instance of it.

Did labor support Torres because she was a strong candidate or was she strong because labor supported her? The answers to this perennial question are yes and yes – and for the entirety of Torres’ political career. After migrating as a child to the United States from Guatemala, she became a dispatcher in the Pomona police department and gained attention for pressuring police to hire Spanish speaking dispatchers. She won a seat on the Pomona City council by 40 votes in 2000 and developed a reputation for showing up at meetings, working hard, and caring for her constituents. Her career then took off. As a local activist said,

If you are just a worker and you win city council then the unions begin to pay attention a lot to you and ... then their resources begin to get allocated to you... AFCSME started getting her what she needed ... then when the [Pomona] mayor died she had the resources to run for that position because the unions were there for her...

Then Norma becomes mayor and ... she has been the first person who has unified union money... but she didn't seek them out initially...the unions look around and they are opportunists. [CA-35_4: text]

We don’t have any detail on what the unification of union money entailed, but three sources alluded to Torres working with unions to build a powerful electoral organization in Pomona.

With roots in a police union, Torres was not a full spectrum liberal. As our source said,

She has been horrible on issues of immigration... this is where the immigrant community get really mad at her.., because you don't go on national television Univision and call people [undocumented immigrants] illegal... [CA-35_4: text]

Torres’s stance on immigration issues – positive but not the main thrust of her efforts – may have helped her solidify support within the union movement as a whole. Construction unions worry about competition from non-union immigrants and oppose candidates who are too actively pro-immigrant, but Torres was within their comfort zone. Unions supported Torres for the state Assembly in 2010 and the state Senate in 2012, both of which races she also won by comfortable margins. She continued to work closely with union officials in her time in Sacramento, where colleagues gave Torres the nickname “Little Monster” for her fierce style.⁶ “She was fantastic in Sacramento,” said the union president. [CA-35_5: 41]

The 2014 primary in CA-35 was a yawner of an election, but a good illustration of the close relationship that often exists between politicians and policy demanders in American politics. As a source said of Torres’ career in Pomona city politics,

⁶ “A child of Guatemala seeks a seat in Congress.” Kevin Freking. *San Diego Union*. Sept. 6, 2014.

if you talk to city hall people they will tell you that she is one of the most conservative Democrats ... but she takes care of her unions because she knows that is her bread and butter..... [CA-35_4: text]

In focusing on representation of her principal group sponsor, Torres exemplifies an establishment candidate. She had two Democratic opponents in the 35th district race, neither of whom was a serious threat. The stronger, Christina Gagnier, was praised by union sources as a candidate of the future, thus suggesting that she was also an establishment candidate.

California 45th district

Republican nominee: **Mimi Walters**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 4 (2 Reps., 1 Dem., 1 independent)

Anchor: None (many groups)

Coordination: None

Factions: Walters, establishment; Raths, insurgent.

Within hours of the safely Republican CA-45 seat coming open, state Senator Mimi Walters made a public statement to enter its open primary and within a month had garnered more 60 endorsements,⁷ the bulk of all endorsements to be made in the race. Included were contributions from the party's House leadership PACs and Main Street PAC. The intent behind Walters' burst of early activity was, as she told us in an interview, to discourage anyone from running against her.

Opposition nonetheless emerged, albeit tentatively. John Moorloch, a county supervisor with strong right-wing support, announced interest in the seat, as did Pat Maciariello, an investment banker and president of the local Lincoln Club. Both looked to be in good positions to raise the money for a strong race if they chose to do so.

What looks in retrospect like a manufactured controversy then followed. Jon Fleischman, curator of the eponymous FlashReport, wrote that Walters had recently voted in to raise taxes and that this violated her pledge to Grover Norquist's Americans for Tax Reform never to raise taxes. Fleischman further reported that Club for Growth was angry about the tax vote and looking for a candidate to run against Walters. Walter's position was that she voted for the continuation of a program that included some fees on business.

But several months passed and no Club-backed candidate emerged. Moreover both Moorloch and Maciariello decided not to run because, as a source said, they were unable to raise money against Walters. Only one Republican entered the primary, a retired Marine officer who was also unable to raise money for a serious campaign. The result was that Walters had an easy primary on the way to a safe seat win in the fall.

CA-45 turn out not to be as safely Republican as it seemed, as Walters lost to a Democrat in the 2018 wave election. But it's important to ask: Why was Walters did Walters face no strong and well-funded opponent when at a time when CA-45 was widely assumed to be indefinitely safe for whatever Republican won it?

One factor was lucky timing for Walters. When the House seat opened, she was well along in building a campaign transition from California state Senator to County Supervisor in Orange County. But she was able to quickly convert her emerging supervisors campaign to a House campaign, thereby getting a jump on potential opponents

⁷ [Check interview.](#)

Moorloch's personal situation is another likely contributor to Walters' commanding position. The strongest of the potential challenges to Walters, Moorloch told reporters that he needed to help with his daughter's move to another state before committing to the House race. This took several months and by the time Moorloch was ready to run, Walters had vacuumed up most available support – or enough, at any rate, to make it hard for him or anyone else to raise money from donors wary of a lost cause. Walters told us several times that deterring opposition through early shows of strength was her conscious strategy. Republican men, she commented, don't like losing to girls.

What about anchoring? Was strong support from one particular group part of Walters' strategy to deter opposition? In a lengthy interview with Walters and in our own examination of her FEC reports, we found no evidence that Walters anchored her campaign in any particular group. She was a former investment banker but raised only about \$150,000 from this group, which is well short of our criterion for anchoring. She developed a reputation in Sacramento for defending property rights and development, but raised only about \$150,000 from interests associated with this grouping. She also had clusters of support in medicine and energy, both of which are important in her district. Our conclusion is that her campaign was not anchored in any particular group.

Colorado 4th district

Republican nominee: **Ken Buck**

Method: Party endorsement convention followed by one-stage primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: National party

Coordination: National party

Factions: Top two candidates both insurgents.

Beginning in the late 1990s, Buck began making occasional weekend forays around the state to meet and befriend local activists and by the late 2000s had hired an assistant to efficiently map out what had become frequent three-day trips. In 2010 he turned the friendships thus made to a run for the Republican Senate nomination in the state party endorsement convention. Buck was at that point an obscure county prosecutor but shocked insiders by winning a thin majority in the convention vote against the establishment favorite. Buck parlayed the convention win into a successful national fundraising campaign and with the money thus raised beat the establishment favorite again in the party primary. But there the run ended. Buck lost in the general election to a Democrat who was widely considered a weak candidate and did so in a year in which Republicans did well nationwide.

Buck's performance marked him as a weak candidate in the eyes of party leaders, but he was undaunted and declared in 2013 that he would run for the Senate again in 2014. Party leaders had been trying to lure Corey Gardener, a popular conservative House member from Buck's 4th congressional district, into the Senate race, but with Buck already declared, Gardener refused to enter the fray. Finally, representatives of the national party brokered an arrangement in Washington between representatives of the two candidates whereby Buck would quit the Senate race, Gardener would enter it, and Buck would become a candidate for Gardener's vacated House seat in the 4th district. The candidates themselves steered clear of these negotiations, which permitted them to say there had been no party deal. But in a personal meeting, Buck and Gardner agreed to the basic terms that had been worked out in Washington.

Perhaps due to the unusual manner by which Buck became a House candidate, he raised support from Republican leadership committees that typically support establishment candidates. Buck, however, did not trim his far-right positions for the House campaign and picked up an endorsement from the Family Research Council. In its story on the race, *The Hill* described Buck as the "tea party favorite" in the race. The second-place finisher was Scott Renfroe, an outspoken social conservative whom *Roll Call* described as a Tea Party activist.⁸

A Downsian framework goes some way to explain this set of facts: Buck won the convention endorsement due to appeal to activists who tend to be extreme; won the Republican Senate primary because primary voters tend also to be extreme; lost the general election for Senate

⁸ <https://rollcall.com/2013/07/03/ken-buck-local-lawmakers-consider-senate-race-cosen/>.

Accessed September 4, 2022.

because the larger electorate was more moderate; and won the 2014 House primary because the median primary election voter in the Republican 4th district was more extreme than the state median. A Downsian account, however, gets the convention vote wrong: Buck did not win because he was more extreme, but because he politicked heavily for it. It also misses several party-centric factors: the existence of a state nominating convention in which to rise and gain attention; the machinations of party leaders to get Buck out of the Senate race in 2014, which he might have again lost, and into a race he could win; and, most politically important even if outside the scope of this analysis, the maneuvering of Gardener into the 2014 Senate race, which he won even though he was not much if any less conservative than Buck. Our analysis lays stress on the party factor, which is what got Buck into the House primary that he won. It would, however, also be reasonable to argue that the state activists who supported Buck in the 2010 state convention were the ultimate anchor for his House bid, since they established his credibility within the party. Either way, Buck's support from a party group is the key to his success in the House primary.

Florida 13th district

Republican nominee: **David Jolly**

Method: Special primary

Number of primary candidates: 3

Anchor: Informal party organization (Sembler group)

Coordination: IPO

Factions: Top two both establishment

For more than 40 years, Bill Young represented St. Petersburg and Tampa Bay in the House of Representatives. When he died in office in 2013, newspapers mentioned eight Republican office holders and former office holders who were giving serious consideration to running as his replacement in the Florida 13th district. But none formally declared. The reason, as our interviews made clear, was that everyone was waiting to see if Mark Baker, the hugely popular former mayor of Saint Petersburg, would run. The view was that he would be unbeatable both for the Republican nomination and for general election to the seat. But although besieged by telephone calls from national party leaders, Baker hesitated and eventually decided for family reasons to stay out. The nomination was his for the taking, but he didn't want it.

Within hours of Baker's announcement, David Jolly, a Washington lobbyist with no prior electoral experience, declared himself a candidate. The next day, Mel Sembler, a top national Republican fundraiser who lives in the district and takes an interest in local politics, declared for Jolly. Over the next few days, all of the politicians who had previously expressed interest in the race made decisions to stay out. This situation drew an amused commentary in the *Tampa Bay Times*:

Folks have been speculating, plotting and maneuvering for years in anticipation of this seat finally coming open. One would-be candidate said it should have been a bloodbath with a half-dozen politicians elbowing their way to the front of the line. Instead, the frontrunner is a guy nobody had heard of a month ago. What gives? Where are the big names? Why does everyone else suddenly have something better to do?

If Sembler is a top figure in the national Republican party, he is a towering figure locally. "He's been key in almost every race in town," said a source. It was unlikely, this source also said, that Sembler, a power in national politics, would allow himself to be beaten in a federal race in his bailiwick and therefore unlikely that politicians would lightly risk taking him on.

Although regularly active in Tampa Bay politics, Sembler seemed to have no personal axes to grind. His interest, as sources told us, was simply to get good candidates for his party and community. Asked his view of Sembler, the chair of a county Republican party declared "he is a saint." Asked the same question, an office holder whom Sembler had supported choked up and was unable to speak.

Besides the politicians who were indebted to Sembler, one of the leading political consultants in the area was described to us as a member of Sembler's "political family." This reference to a top consultant, Sembler's regular participation in local politics, his reputation for winning, his concern for his party, and his ability to raise money – as much, opponents might

fear, as he needed to raise – mark him, in our theoretical jargon, as the leader of an informal party organization and justify an inference that, in backing Jolly, he conferred viability on Jolly that, lacking prior electoral experience, Jolly probably would not have had.

But Sembler's was not the only IPO in the area. Nor was Jolly the only office holder in the race for the open seat. A group centered on state Senator Jack Latvala also regularly sponsored candidates in the politics of this area, was often at odds with the Sembler group, and sponsored a candidate for the open House seat. She was Kathleen Peters, a first term member of the state Assembly who entered the race after bigger names had decided to take a pass. Newspaper stories depicted her as inarticulate in debates and distracted by the need to care for her elderly father. Another source regarded her as a sacrificial lamb for the Latvala group.

Latvala had been active in Republican politics in Florida for some 40 years as the owner of a political mailer and fundraising service for numerous local politicians, some of whom he personally recruited for local office. Sources regarded him as the leader of a de facto machine and Peters as one of his politicians.

Our interviewer in the Florida 13th was told that Latvala proscribes his politicians from speaking to the news media except at his direction, and none responded to our numerous interview requests. At one point our interviewer established a friendly conversation with a Latvala-identified politician at a party function, but when the politician was asked for a formal interview, he denied the request and abruptly broke off the conversation. Hence our knowledge of his political network is entirely second-hand. It is nonetheless clear that the Latvala network constitutes a second significant coalition in the Tampa Bay area that includes the Florida 13th district.

With Sembler as the chair of his finance committee, Jolly easily raised more money than either Peters or the third candidate in the primary, a retired airline pilot who ran as a constitutional conservative. None of the three candidates had extensive local volunteer networks. Jolly also scored an easy win in the primary and won the general election as well.

Backed by one of the Republican Party's leading national fundraisers, Jolly must be considered an establishment candidate. Latvala's IPO, viewed locally as politically moderate and business oriented, is likewise an establishment creature, with its candidate the same.

Florida 19th district, special election

Republican nominee: **Curt Clawson**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: None, candidate-centered

Coordination: NA

Factions: Clawson insurgent; Benacquisto establishment

Curt Clawson emphasized the theme “Outsider for Congress” throughout his campaign and garnered the endorsements of several Tea-Party identified public officials and groups. He self-funded his campaign and won 38 percent of the vote in a four-candidate field. The second-place finisher was Lizbeth Benacquisto, a state Senator then serving as Majority Leader of the Senate.

We unable to conduct interviews in this district, but we take the above material to be sufficient evidence to classify the race: Absent information to the contrary, a contest between a major state party leader and a candidate who bases his campaign on his lack of political experience is highly likely to be a contest between an establishment and an insurgent.⁹

⁹ This account is based on “An Analysis of the 2014 FL-19 Republican Race,” by Michael Bezoian in PS 191C in Spring quarter 2016. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix.

Georgia 1st district

Republican nominee: **Buddy Carter**

Method: Party primary with runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent of primary vote

Number of primary candidates: 6

Anchor: Pharmacists (group)

Coordination: No.

Factions: Carter, establishment; Johnson, insurgent

See race description in text.

Georgia 10th district

Republican nominee: **Jody Hice**

Method: Primary with runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent in primary

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: Evangelical activists (group)

Coordination: No

Faction: Hice insurgent, Collins establishment

“... this is probably one of the most important things I can tell you ... that between the primary and the runoff and the general [the Hice campaign] did 289,000 doors and dials ... I just can't express to you how – *that's a lot of voter contact!* ... [that's] live doors and live dials, that's not robo calls, that's people talking to people.”

The source of this remark said repeatedly that voter contact as organized by the campaign and carried out by volunteers was the heart of Rev. Jody Hice's successful nomination over two well-financed business candidates and four also-rans. [GA-10_2. 10:00]. The campaign did mass mailings and social media, though nothing on television, but the main tool of the campaign was direct voter contact.

So where did the person power for this labor-intensive activity come from? In response to this question, the source mentioned two places. The first was Ten Commandments Georgia, an evangelical organization promoting the public display of important historical documents, including the biblical Ten Commandments. Hice had been “a leader” of that group “for several years,” the source said. The second place mentioned was a college intern program based mainly at the University of Georgia at Athens and its Republican Club.

The source did not volunteer Hice's large church as a group from which volunteers were recruited. (Churches are sensitive about support for candidates because it can cost them their non-partisan tax exempt status.) When we asked about church volunteers, the source said that Hice had resigned from leadership of his church six months before the primary and that “[the campaign] wasn't tied in [to his church], he [Hice] just knew a lot of people and those people came in and volunteered for him.” [GA-10_2. 18:00]. A second person present for the interview commented, “I wouldn't say he recruited them [church members], I think it was more or less like, when he got in the race and it's a very close-knit community. ... it was very much like, ‘we love Jody, so let's go do this.’ [GA-10_2. 18:30].

Within our theoretical framework, Hice's substantial volunteer support from Ten Commandments Georgia and from his former church constitutes evidence that his campaign was anchored people whom we term, for want of a better term, evangelical activists.

Hice's leading support for placing the Ten Commandments in public buildings mark him as a leader of insurgent politics. In a debate with Mike Mike Collins, son of a former congressman of the same name, Hice made clear his strongly negative view of his party's establishment. As he said to Collins:

“You've said a number of times that your political philosophy is closely identified with that of your dad. He was very good on some social issues, but he went along with the

establishment. ...This looks like a sequel that's a nightmare," Hice said after citing several votes by the elder Collins to raise the debt ceiling, his own salary and to approve the No Child Left Behind Act.¹⁰

In the same debate, Hice opposed re-election of John Boehner as House Speaker, a position Collins declined to take. Collins' positions in the debate were all conventionally Republican, including his description of himself as a "Reagan conservative" and "just a small business man from Jackson, Ga."

¹⁰. "Hice, Collins debate in Watkinsville for 10th District seat." Kelsey Cochran. Online Athens Banner-Herald, July 9, 2014. Accessed September 5, 2022

Georgia 11th district

Republican nominee: **Barry Loudermilk**

Method: Method: Primary with runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent in primary

Number of primary candidates: 6

Anchor: Volunteer activists (group)

Coordination: None

Factions: Top two both insurgent.

Loudermilk showed little interest in the nitty gritty of legislation during eight years he served in the state legislature, feeling that, as a source quoted Loudermilk as saying, “the country already has too many laws.” Rather than tending to legislation, Loudermilk spent his time “going group to group in [the district] building an army.” The groups to which he spoke were Tea Party clubs and church groups. “He was out there talking to them constantly, doing seminars on his version of the Constitution.” By the time Loudermilk ran for Congress, he had been speaking regularly in the district for a least a decade and had recruited a large volunteer force.

According to a source inside his campaign, Loudermilk based the campaign mainly on these volunteers. This is thin evidence, but the source was authoritative and firm on this point.

Loudermilk got support from Club for Growth, Madison Project, FreedomWorks, and the Family Research Council, thus marking him as an insurgent candidate. The second-place candidate, Bob Barr, was a former Libertarian candidate for President and hence an insurgent as well.

Hawaii 1st district

Democratic nominee: **Mark Takai**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: Veterans (group)

Coordination: None

Factions: Top two both establishment.

In his 20 years career in the Hawaii legislature, Mark Takai was a steady advocate for education and for veterans, serving as chair of committees on these topics for much of his tenure. But at no time in his lengthy career did Takai hold a party leadership post, nor was he an influence within the power councils of his party [HI-1-11 (1) 12:20], nor did he often claim the media spotlight. But when he sought for the Democratic nomination to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2014, his service to veterans and teachers was repaid. VoteVets, a lobby for veterans, made an Independent Expenditure of \$175,000 to his campaign and individual veterans and others with military associations contributed an estimated \$95,000, for a total of \$269,000. Leaders of Hawaii's teachers unions planned a campaign that would have engaged several hundred teachers in knocking doors and passing out literature for Takai.¹¹ Takai trailed in early polls on the Democratic primary, but he caught up, outspent his principal opponent by a margin of \$929,000 to \$762,000, and outpolled her on Election Day by a margin of 44 percent to 28 percent.

Takai's nomination was thus consistent with the themes of this study. But his principal opponent, Senate President Donna Mercado Kim, followed a quite different model that is worth reviewing. Rather than establishing a relationship with a particular group, she emphasized public investigations and media attention. She had no preconceived targets – unless, as suggested by some sources, it was the University of Hawaii – but would “go after business or government... If there's any opening she'll go after it,” as a source said [HI-1_11 (1) 16]. “Anything to grab media attention, for the shock value,” said another. HI-1_3 (2). 1:50. Another source said that, while Kim's investigatory style was sometimes rooted in conviction, “much of it is really contrived. She's very savvy when it comes to getting attention.” HI-1_3 (2) 20:30. Her aggressive tactics were off-putting to some of our sources, but they got her into the public eye and thence into an early poll lead.

Another difference from Takai was Kim's use of bundlers as a mainstay of her fundraising. The basic idea of bundling is that an individual collects money from multiple donors and presents it to the candidate, thereby enhancing the bundler's standing with the future office holder. As a source said, “[Kim's] fundraising comes from close relationship with people who I would classify

¹¹ Our interview with teachers union leaders occurred several months before the election so we do not know whether teachers followed through on this plan.

as your typical bundlers ... She's got a small group of people who are well-connected insiders that have relationships that are interrelated in terms of [businesses. [HI-1_11 (1) 4:30].

This bundler model is quite different than the anchoring model featured in our analysis. Because we did not systematically inquire about bundling – a mistake on our part – we do not know how common the practice is in House primaries. But it is possible that it is very common, used by anchored and non-anchored candidates to add to their campaign chests.

We do not claim that Takai's reliance on an anchoring model explains his win over Kim. As always in contested races, multiple factors were at work. If we were to make a guess about the key to the race, it would be ethnicity. Takai is of Japanese ancestry and roughly 28 percent of primary voters were expected to be Japanese American. Donna Mercado Kim half Filipino on her mother's side and 23 percent of primary voters were expected to be of that ethnicity. Takai's slight advantage in terms of numbers of co-ethnic voters was enhanced by three factors. One was that he was the only Japanese American candidate while Kim was one of three Filipinos in the House primary. Another was that Japanese American candidates were competing in Democratic Senate and gubernatorial primaries, which was expected to exert an extra pull on Japanese Americans, already a high turnout group, to come out and vote. And finally, supporters of the higher level Japanese American candidates were attempting to raise the salience of ethnicity. As a source said, they were

... playing to Japanese ethnicity in the Governor and Senate races and it may spill over to House race. They are consciously trying to create this environment where the Japanese voters will vote for the same candidates. It is a word-of-mouth campaign, but it is also driven by targeted mail. They actually run ads that are blatantly Japanese. Hi-1_3 (2) 13:00

Ethnicity was most damaging to Stanley Chang, the third strongest candidate in the race. His problem was that the percentage of Chinese Americans in the Democratic primary electorate was expected to be in the single digits. It is striking, a Chang supporter mused,

how, in races like this, how little is within your control. No one controls whether you have a Japanese name, or anyone else has a Japanese name, no one controls whether there's seven candidates in the race or three candidates in the race. ... all that stuff... the stars have to align in crazy ways. There's just a lot of stuff that's out of your control. You can work the hardest, you can do X, Y, and Z ... and you won't necessarily be successful.

By working within the system to serve the needs of two groups, Takai appears to be an establishment candidate. One indication of an insurgency orientation was that the Progressive Change Campaign Committee (PCCC) endorsed him, but none of our many sources in this race viewed Takai as far to the left. Rather, they saw him as falling between the very conservative Kim and the leftist alternative, Stanley Chang. Kim, on account of her support from EMILY's List, counts as an insurgent candidate.

Iowa 1st District

Democratic nominee: **Pat Murphy**

Method: Party primary, with convention if no candidate gets at least 35 percent of vote

Number of primary candidates: 5

Anchor: Unions (group)

Coordination: Union

Factions: Top two candidates both establishment

Iowa is a heavily agricultural state, but the 1st district is located in the northeastern section of the district with significant manufacturing and hence significant union activity. When asked about union influence in primary elections, sources told us three things. First, union influence was much less than four or five decades ago, when union leaders largely picked party nominees. Second, even over the last decade, union influence was slipping due to some members becoming Republican. Third, unions remained the most important source of organized Democratic campaign support in the district.¹² This support consisted of newspapers and campaign mailers to members; phone banking; door knocking and leaflet drops; and fetching and returning absentee ballots. Unions also made indirect contributions of money and influenced some donors to do so as well.

We cannot ourselves see and measure union support for endorsed candidates, but based on these general comments, we take the fact that 18 of 20 unions that made endorsements in the primary supported Pat Murphy to be sufficient for anchoring.¹³

The Progressive Change Campaign Committee endorsed Murphy late in the race, which suggests he should be viewed as an insurgent candidate. But this was the only such suggestion. He was not the furthest left candidate in the race and his score on the Shor-McCarty NPAT score place him in the more conservative half of his caucus in the Iowa state Assembly. His record on abortion from early in his legislative career set off a debate within EMILY's List on whether to target him with attack ads. When our sources characterized Murphy, they usually depicted him as a solidly liberal union candidate but never as an insurgent. We therefore classify him as an establishment candidate.

The second-place finisher was Monica Vernon, a Cedar Rapids council member who was until recently a Republican. Our sources viewed her as liberal but not overly so. She too appears to be an establishment candidate.

¹² [IA-1 (2) -6. 10:30; IA-1(3)-1. 129:00; Bleeding Heartland blog, May 24, 2014, <https://www.bleedingheartland.com/2014/05/21/labor-union-endorsements-in-contested-2014-iowa-democratic-primaries/>

¹³ Ibid.

Iowa 3rd district (Democrat)

Democratic nominee: **Stacey Appel**

Method: Party primary, with convention if no candidate gets 35 percent

Number of primary candidates: 1

Anchor: National Party (DCCC)

Coordination: DCCC and EMILY's List cooperated to clear field for Appel

Faction: Insurgent

With Barack Obama having carried the 3rd district by four points in 2012, the DCCC was interested in sponsor a strong challenge to its Republican incumbent, Tom Latham, and early in 2013 met with two potential challengers. One was businessman Mike Sherzan and the other was Staci Appel, a former state legislator. Following the meeting, DCCC staff told Hill reporters they hoped Appel would run.¹⁴ At about the same time, Sherzan, citing personal circumstances, said he would not. After some hesitation, Appel declared her candidacy in July. In August EMILY's List declared its full support for her and in September the DCCC gave her its formal support. In December, Latham retired, creating an open seat with Appel the only declared candidate.

At some point early in the campaign – our source did not specify – a rumor reached EMILY's List that an “Iowa leader” considered Appel a poor choice and was making noises about finding someone else. Our source said that EMILY's List staff responded aggressively, phoning an official of the AFSCME union to say that EL would “crush” any candidate that ran against Appel and urging the union not to spend money in opposition to Appel. Appel remained unopposed in the Democratic primary. [DC-4. EL II. 13:50]

DCCC and EL both gave Appel early backing and both appear to have played a role in field clearing for her. But since the DCCC apparently acted sooner on both counts we give it credit for anchoring Appel's campaign.

¹⁴ “Iowa: House Democrats Talk to Ex-State Senator About Latham Challenge.” Shira Toeplitz, *Congressional Quarterly News*, April 1, 2013. Accessed September 5, 2022.

Iowa 3rd district (Republican)

Republican nominee: **Brad Zaun, David Young**

Method: Primary, district convention

Number of primary candidates: 6

Anchor: None

Coordination: None

Factions: Zaun, insurgent; Young, establishment.

Iowa law requires candidates to get at least 35 percent of the primary vote to win a party nomination. If no primary candidate reaches that threshold, a convention of the district's elected committee members – several hundred strong in the 3rd district – chooses the party nominee from among the candidates in the primary.

A convention was widely expected in Iowa's 3rd district nomination because the primary had six candidates, five of whom had sufficient resources to run effective campaigns and thereby splinter the vote. And indeed, the first-place finisher in the primary, State Assemblyman Brad Zaun, got only 25 percent of the vote due to strong showings by four of the other five. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Zaun achieved his first-place finish on the basis of only \$110,000 in campaign spending, the lowest spending of any primary winner in our study. And Zaun did not have a strong volunteer campaign either. The reason for his generally weak campaign effort was, sources told us, that Zaun's longtime campaign manager was sidelined by illness. Zaun appears to have finished first mainly because he was well-known to voters from previous elections and from a high media presence.

The second-place finisher was Robert Cramer, chairman of the Iowa Family leader, an important religiously conservative group in the state. We therefore classify Cramer as an insurgent candidate.

So choice of nominee went to a convention in which delegates vote by sequential elimination – a series of ballots in which last place candidates are eliminated one-by-one until only a winner remains. Zaun made it to the last round of balloting, where he faced off against David Young, who had finished fifth in the primary. By their closing speeches to the convention, Zaun had established himself as an anti-government libertarian and drove the point home by boldly proclaiming that delegates seeking a member of Congress who would bring pork to the district should not look to him as their candidate. In his closing speech, Young emphasized that he wanted merely to cut government, not destroy it, which marked him as an establishment candidate.

Young was the former chief of staff to Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley, in which capacity he developed relationships with a wide selection of Iowa's interest and social groups.

So the bottom line is that neither the primary nor the convention winner had anything like a campaign anchor. For Zaun this was because he had a small campaign; for Young it was because his previous job required him to serve many groups, not just one.

Illinois 2nd district

Democratic nominee: **Robin Kelly**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 16

Anchor: NA

Coordination: Informal party organization

Factions: Top two both establishment

One white and sixteen black candidates entered the primary for the safely Democratic open seat in South Chicago and adjoining suburban area. The white candidate, Debbie Halvorson, had previously served in the House in an older district and led early polls. But the majority of voters in the current district were African American and their leaders wanted the seat, which was being vacated by Jesse Jackson, Jr., for a black. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg helped out with an expensive ad campaign against Halvorson for her opposition to gun control. But with 16 black candidates splitting the African American vote, it appeared Halvorson might win unless one of the top black candidates dropped out of the race.

Two black candidates were at the top of the field, both with community support and ample campaign funds. But as election day approached, one of the candidates, Robin Kelly, pulled ahead in prestige endorsements and rumors flew that Mayor Rahm Emanuel was working behind the scenes to persuade candidates other than Kelly to drop out. Nine days before the election, one of the top two black candidates did drop out, thereby sealing the nomination for Kelly.

We did not conduct interviews in this district and do not have further detail about how this bit of field shaping was accomplished. However, we do not believe further detail is needed to assess that informal party management of the field – a form of coordinated support – was part of the story.

But how did Kelly get herself into the position of being one of the two top African American candidates in the race? Without interviews, we have no information on the groups that may have anchored Kelley's early campaign and must leave the case unclassified on this point.

Kelly was a career politician in Chicago politics, serving most recently as chief administrative officer of Cook County. Except for her conservative position on gun, Halvorson's took conventional Democratic positions on most issues, as summarized by Ballotpedia.¹⁵ We thus view both candidates as establishment types.

¹⁵ https://ballotpedia.org/Debbie_Halvorson. Accessed September 6, 2022.

Louisiana 5th district

Republican nominee: **Vance McAllister**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 5 Dems., 7 Reps., 2 other

Anchor: Candidate-centered (McAllister)

Coordination: Informal party organization (for Riser)

Factions: McAllister unclassifiable; Riser establishment.

This special election began with the summer 2013 resignation of the incumbent MC. Republican. State Senator Neil Riser announced his candidacy the next day and was able to tout the endorsements of most major Republican office holders. When Republican Governor Bobby Jindal decided to set the special election just 12 days ahead, Riser looked like a shoo-in. But the political climate changed when a newspaper revealed that Riser had filed campaign papers a week before the incumbent resigned. What had initially seemed a strong candidacy now smacked of a deal – the Neil Deal, as journalists dubbed it – to subvert the electoral process. This pressure led Jindal to reset the election date to allow more candidates to get into the race, and 13 additional candidates did so. A total of seven Republicans, five Democrats, two Libertarians, a Green, and two Independents entered the state’s Top Two primary. Riser managed to finish at the head of the pack with 32 percent the first-stage vote, but with five Democrats splitting that party’s vote share in a heavily Republican district, the second-place finisher was also a Republican. This was bad news for Riser because it meant that, instead of facing an easily beatable Democrat in the runoff, he had to go head-to-head the fellow Republican who had finished second, Vance McAllister.

McAllister had never previously been active in politics, got no support from Republican interests, and funded his campaign mainly from personal wealth. But he caught a break when the TV stars of Duck Dynasty, a reality show featuring Louisiana country folk, endorsed and made ads for him. This, along with the opportunistic endorsement of a leading Democrat, powered McAllister to a 60 to 40 percent win over Riser in the second stage election.

McAllister came from father outside mainstream politics than any other winner in our sample and was primaried out of office after just one term. His downfall was being caught on security video in a storage room kissing the wife of his campaign manager, earning him the sobriquet “kissing Congressman.” That a character as marginal as McAllister could win election to Congress highlights the wide open and potentially chaotic nature of the selection process.

Of equal significance was the Neil Deal, the botched effort to nominate Riser through a 12-day campaign in which he was the only viable candidate. According to our sources, this ploy was orchestrated by Governor Jindal’s political consultants and leading party supporters. Because it was joined by many state Republican office holders who agreed behind the scenes to endorse Riser before the current MC had retired, we take the whole group to be an example – albeit, an odd one – of informal party organization. This is the only case in our set in which a party-backed candidate lost to a candidate-centered campaign.

The so-called Neil Deal marked Riser all too clearly as an establishment candidate, but what was McAllister? One possibility is to dismiss him as unserious but profiting from public distaste

for the Neil Deal. Another is to view him as a protest candidate against insider corruption and as such an insurgent. We think the first is the better choice.

Louisiana 6th district

Republican nominee: **Garret Graves**

Method: Top two primary

Number of primary candidates: 4 Dems., 7 Rep., 1 other

Anchor: Maritime business sector (group)

Coordination: Politically active businessman

Factions: Top two both establishment

A section of this case study appears in the text, but for space reasons omitted much informative detail.

The nomination contest in the Louisiana 6th district (Baton Rouge) began early in 2013 when the Republican incumbent announced that he would resign. Paul Dietzel, an electoral novice, was the first candidate to enter the race. He began an aggressive fundraising campaign in May 2013, for the primary 18 months later (November 2014.) Dan Claitor, a three-term state senator, entered in January 2014, followed in late March by Garret Graves, a former congressional staffer and state administrator specializing in issues of coastal development and protection.

Though Dietzel lacked a record of political accomplishment, he had two important assets. First, as the grandson and namesake of a famous LSU football coach, his name was widely recognized both by voters and by business donors in particular. Second, many observers described Dietzel as an exceptionally likable and energetic fundraiser. He worked systematically through lists of donors to previous campaigns, calling, visiting, and buttonholing everyone he could. One source, a top party fundraiser, told us that he initially declined Dietzel's requests, but eventually -- worn down by repeated importuning -- made a personal contribution despite the candidate's inexperience. This source, however, did not sponsor a fundraising event for Dietzel, as he often had done for candidates in other races. Another source, also a regular party fundraiser, said that he made a personal contribution to Dietzel because he found him to be "a good Christian businessman," but also declined to sponsor an event.


The second major candidate, Dan Claitor, was described by several sources as one of the hardest working politicians in the state legislature. He was said to be an independent thinker, someone who would read every major bill, listen thoughtfully to all sides, and reach his own fair-minded conclusions. A veteran journalist told us that Claitor is known for "pushing good ideas that everyone recognizes as good ideas" despite being politically infeasible, and for trying to "stop bad ideas that can't be stopped." Claitor's fundraising did not go well; business donors were not enthusiastic. Realizing early on that he would likely have trouble raising money, Claitor concentrated on mobilizing personal connections from his state senate district. He claimed to personally know some 20,000 people and was confident they could furnish enough votes to place him at the top of the fractured field.

The third candidate, Garret Graves, had spent 15 years as legislative staff for several Louisiana members of Congress, specializing in maritime issues such as flood control, energy

development, and river transportation. In 2008 he was appointed by Governor Bobby Jindal as Chairman of the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority in Baton Rouge, where he oversaw development of a state master plan for the coastal area and the BP cleanup. Graves was widely praised, in public sources and in our interviews, for his performance in this position. He resigned shortly before entering Louisiana’s all-party House primary that already included Dietzel, Claitor, three additional Republicans and three Democrats.

At the time Graves entered the race, Dietzel’s months of relentless effort had him leading the field in cumulative fundraising. As the Figure below shows, however, Graves shot ahead almost immediately, raising more money in two months than Dietzel had in a year. By the November primary, Graves had more than twice Dietzel’s money. He finished comfortably at the top of the Republican field, and bested the leading Democrat in the December run-off. Graves’s fundraising success was bolstered by support from a maritime business network centered around Lane Grigsby, semi-retired as CEO of a large and diversified maritime construction firm but still very active in politics. Data journalists for the New Orleans *Times Picayune* found Grigsby’s personal network of donors to be the third largest in the state, just behind the state Democratic Party and just ahead of the state Republican Party.¹⁶ Grigsby, who spoke to us on the record about his activity in this election, estimated that he could raise up to

Raising Funds in LA-6 With and Without Networked Vouching



\$250,000 for a candidate from his family and business associates, and another \$250,000 from other connections, magnitudes consistent with other reports. To put these figures in perspective, median primary spending among all 2014 winnable open seat candidates who received at least 10% of the vote was \$460,108.

Grigsby observed that any of the plausible LA-6 candidates would vote “the way they should” in Congress. That said, he had been dissatisfied with the field prior to Graves’s entry, characterizing Dietzel as “really not worthwhile” and fifty-something Claitor as too old and lacking in energy. Grigsby said he had tried unsuccessfully to recruit some half-dozen

¹⁶http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/11/louisianas_top_400_political_c.html

candidates to the race, including one he was ready to support before commissioning research that turned up a disqualifying skeleton. But after describing these failed efforts, Grigsby brightened, saying that he might be able to support Graves. His main concern was that some of his company's executives felt Graves had made "blunders" in his work as coastal administrator. Grigsby did an initial private interview with Graves at which the latter explained how he had recovered from a wayward youth and, based on this meeting, Grigsby arranged a second meeting, scheduled for the next day, for Graves to meet his executives to discuss the alleged mistakes. Looking ahead to the meeting, Grigsby said:

I'm gonna tell you, everybody makes mistakes, everybody can't get things perfect. When you own your mistakes is when I like you. It's when you deny 'em, and you're absolutely assuming I'm stupid... then you and I probably can't get along too well. So I'm interested to see what Garret says tomorrow

The meeting, as Grigsby described it in a follow-on interview, went well.

[PoG] *What happened*

[Grigsby] He gives his stump speech, and they ask questions

[PoG: *What were the questions about?*]

[Grigsby] Issues that are interesting to them as individuals or us as a corporation... further refinements of positions he might have had... or about coastal recovery or programs for coastal recovery which he led first... they were questions about issues he might have to vote on as a congressman

The meeting lasted about an hour, with a third of the time spent on Graves' plan for winning the seat, a third spent on issues of national politics, such as abortion, and a third on particular maritime issues. On the most important of his supposed blunders, Graves admitted error, but said he had acted on incorrect information from subordinates whom he had subsequently fired.

We named the names and we named the instances and he [Graves] said, "egg all over my face, I listened to what staff was telling me, when you brought it back up I went and looked at it, absolutely we were wrong, that person has been terminated." ... And they [the executives] went back and checked up on his answers... They came back later and said, "You know, he did fire that guy."

After Graves left, Grigsby said he would be supporting him and that others wishing to do so could leave checks on his secretary's desk. Grigsby recalled his recommendation as follows:

Hey, you know, your income stream is a function of how well we do as a business, my engagement in the community helps our business, I would ask you to make a personal sacrifice...

Grigsby emphasized that his executives were free to follow his recommendation or not, as they saw fit. But many followed. After calling everyone with reminders, his secretary collected about \$100,000 in contributions to Graves, including some contributions from Grigsby's family.

Grigsby said also that he relayed his support for Graves to two leading electrical and mechanical contractors who rely on his advice, and he said he would likely bring Graves before

five PAC boards on which he has influence. We view this additional activity as indicating informal coordination among groups.

Multiple other businesses in Louisiana's maritime sector likewise contributed to Graves's funding. Among them were Koch Industries, Environmental Defense Action Fund, Louisiana River Pilots Association, Ecolab Inc, and Shell Oil Company Employee's Political Awareness Committee. Each of these and some three dozen other PACs with maritime connections most likely had its own screening and money collection procedures, and their total contribution to Graves was probably larger than that of the Grigsby network.

Sampling from FEC records, we found that about 56 percent of Graves' funds came from individuals or PACs with connections to the maritime sector, based on coding of profession and employer information. Comparable estimates of maritime donations are about 30 percent for the second-place finisher in the LA-6 race (Dietzel) and six percent for the third-place finisher (Claitor), but over much smaller totals.

It is useful to contrast Graves's success in as a maritime business champion with the strategies of the other candidates. Paul Dietzel's energetic fundraising exemplifies the personal ambition that many political scientists see as driving electoral success. But in terms of conveying relevant information to potential supporters, Dietzel's efforts met limited success. Similarly, Dan Claitor's record as a thoughtful, fair-minded legislator may have signaled competence and perhaps also commitment to the common good, but he was unabashedly nobody's champion and this seemed not to help him. We must obviously avoid drawing large conclusions from the experience of one individual, but Claitor's limited success as a fundraiser is certainly consistent with our view that what groups most want in a legislator is someone committed to their particular interests.

All in all, the LA-6 case illustrates more of our theoretical ideas than any other in the PoG study. Yet the case has two features that merit extra attention: The first is that, while Grigsby is a major player in Republican politics, he doesn't identify as a Republican and sometimes works with Democrats. For example, he actively supports business friendly black candidates in African American districts where the GOP has no chance. Thus for Grigsby as, we suspect, for many other elite participants in party nominations, group values are a stronger drive than party loyalty. The second notable feature of this case is that at no point did Graves exhibit special commitment to maritime business interests. The wide praise for his work as Coastal Administrator, along with an expenditure of \$240,000 for Graves by the Environmental Defense Action Fund, strengthen the impression that he was not a booster of maritime business interests. Policy competence alone seemed in this case to be sufficient to gain group support.

Final note: Both Graves and Dietzel campaigned for financial support as business oriented conservatives, with no hint of insurgent commitment in either. We therefore count them both as establishment candidates.

Massachusetts 5th district, special election

Democratic nominee: **Katherine Clark**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 5

Anchor: Feminist groups

Coordination: No

Factions: Clark, insurgent; Koutoujian, establishment

EMILY's List endorsed Clark, but only in the last month of the campaign.¹⁷ EL was still able to make an Independent Expenditure of \$145,000, but its late endorsement may have been worth \$50,000 in campaign services rather than the \$100,000 we normally assume.¹⁸ With \$7,500 in conduited individual donations from EL and \$6,500 in feminist PAC contributions, we thus identify \$210,000 in support to Clark from feminist sources, which is short of our \$250,000 criterion of group anchoring.

But we believe that the figure of \$7,500 in individual contributions from feminist sources is a substantial understatement. It is money that came only through EL and only late in the campaign, but Clark was endorsed by two other feminist organizations (Barbara Lee and Women's Campaign Forum) and ran her public campaign based on women's issues, as described in the text. Other candidates who got group endorsements (e.g., Buddy Carter, Garret Graves) raised 40 to 60 percent of their individual contributions from individuals associated with the group. If Clark raised even 40 percent of her overall contributions from individual feminists, it would amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars. But, of course, FEC data do not include designations for feminist views, so we cannot directly measure Clark's contributions from individual feminist donors.

Viewing the details of Clark's campaign in light of what other candidates do, we are judge that Clark did likely raise at least \$40,000 more from feminist sources than we can observe in FEC data, which would then qualify her campaign as anchored in feminist sources.

As described in the text, the second place candidate, Peter Koutoujian, was a conventional "Massachusetts liberal."

¹⁷ The likely reason for EL's late entry is that there was another woman, Karen Spilka, in the race and EL prefers not to choose between women candidates. However, as the election grew close it became clear that the second Spilka was not competitive and that Clark might not be able to win without a boost from EL.

¹⁸ When, in this case, a contest has two or more female candidates, EMILY's List's policy is to provide all of them with basic campaign services, starting as soon as EL can complete its vetting.

Maine 2nd district (Democrat)

Democratic nominee: **Emily Cain**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: EMILY's LIST (group)

Coordination: No

Faction: Cain, insurgent; Jackson, establishment

EMILY's List put Emily Cain "on the list" in July, 2013. Direct and indirect contributions by EL, its PAC, and other feminist PACs, and individual donations conduited through EMILY's List came to \$280,000, which meets our criterion for group anchoring.

The second candidate, Troy Jackson, had strong support from union PACs and was a conventional union Democrat.

The DCCC made a \$5,000 contribution to Cain, but only on June 10, the day of the primary. We were able to find no other indication of a DCCC preference for Cain over Jackson.

In addition, the Environmental Defense Fund, other green PACs, and individuals with green occupational associations made contributions that came to more than \$80,000. It is likely that we undercounted individual contributions due to the EDF endorsement (which were \$18,000 of the above total).

Maine 2nd district (Republican)

Republican nominee: **Bruce Poliquin**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Unclassified

Coordination: None

Factions: Poliquin, insurgent; Raye, establishment

There are three plausible anchors for Bruce Poliquin's winning campaign in this Republican primary. The first potential is the investment and finance business sector. Before entering politics, Poliquin amassed a fortune as an investment manager and, according to our estimate from FEC data, raised about \$150,000 from this sector, an amount which is significantly below our criterion for anchoring unless other resources are supplied as well, which they apparently were not.

The second potential anchor is the Tea Party wing of the Maine state GOP.¹⁹ Until 2010, moderates had dominated the party, but an insurgent group led by Paul LePage gained control of the party in 2010 and elected its ticket, which included LePage as governor. Maine law permits governors to nominate candidates for state Treasurer and LePage nominated Poliquin. Poliquin was thus firmly identified with the insurgent wing of the party, an identification enhanced by an endorsement by FreedomWorks.

In the 2014 House primary Poliquin's sole opponent was Kevin Raye, a former State Senate President and leader of the GOP's moderate faction. Some news coverage framed the contest in these terms. As the *Bangor Daily News* wrote shortly before the primary,

Poliquin has burnished his tea party credentials in the contest with a sharp focus on cutting federal spending and pointed criticism for what he calls career politicians. Raye... has absorbed the establishment label.²⁰

The newspapers summary statement, along with the recent history of Maine Republican politics, warrants classification of the race as establishment vs. insurgent. Burnishing credentials as a group member does not, however, necessarily indicate anchoring one's campaign in that group. Anchoring, as we use the term, requires some tangible form of group

¹⁹ This paragraph is based on "The 2014 2nd Congressional District Republican Primary and the Struggle Between Factions of the Party," UCLA undergraduate Caroline Leahy. in PS 191C in Spring quarter 2016. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix.

²⁰ "Similar party tensions, challenges at play in Maine's GOP, Democratic primaries," Matthew Stone, *Bangor Daily News*. June 6, 2014. Accessed August 24, 2022."

support or assistance, and neither our interviews nor news stories provide evidence of significant Tea Party or other insurgent support for Poliquin.²¹

The third potential anchor is the Christian right, and in this case there is evidence of tangible support. As early as October, 2010, Poliquin approached the Christian Civic League, a politically active group that lobbies the legislature, endorses candidates in elections, and eventually endorsed Poliquin.²² One of our sources, a Democratic consultant, said:

Polequin was very active in socially conservative and evangelical circles... He made a point of going to the churches, reaching out to the Christian conservative leaders. He was interviewed and said all the right things to folks like the Maine Christian Civic League, which is the largest of those groups by far. [ME-2_1. 40:30]

We found nothing more about the role of religious conservatives in the campaign until the following passage in the *Bangor Daily News* story on Poliquin's win:

Bob Emrich, pastor at the Emmanuel Bible Baptist Church in Plymouth and member of the Christian Civic League's board of directors, said Tuesday night that Poliquin's anti-abortion stance helped him in the primary election. *He said he and pastors across the 2nd Congressional District urged their parishioners to turn out for Poliquin.*²³ [Emphasis added]

A later story in the *News* states that Poliquin was

buoyed ... by strong support from the evangelical community, which mobilized voters and helped him defeat Raye, who has supported a woman's right to choose an abortion early in her pregnancy....

"There have been few times ... in which we've been so enthusiastic about endorsing a candidate as Bruce," said Carroll Conley, executive director of the Christian Civic League. "In an unprecedented and unapologetic way, Bruce reached out to the evangelical leadership.

"I think the life issue was the deciding factor," Conley said of Poliquin's primary victory.²⁴

²¹ This discussion relies on "The 2014 2nd Congressional District Republican Primary and the Struggle Between Factions of the Party" by UCLA undergraduate Caroline Leahy in PS 191C in Spring quarter 2016. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix

²² Facebook post, October 10, 2013, "Went to a meeting last night in Houlton...". Accessed on Lexis-Nexis, August 24, 2022.

²³ "GOP's Bruce Poliquin wins 2nd Congressional District primary." by Christopher Cousins. *Bangor Daily News*. June 10, 2014 Updated June 11, 2014. Accessed October 20, 2021

²⁴ Why abortion could become a defining issue in Maine's 2nd District race by Nell Gluckman. *Bangor Daily News*. July 17, 2014. Accessed October 20, 2021.

We have, as usual, no interest in picking a “deciding factor” factor for the outcome of the race. We are, however, interested in the endorsement of an important group, that pastors across the district may have been urging their parishioners to vote for Poliquin, and the suggestion that Poliquin was given access to church congregations – which together do constitute evidence of concrete group support. What is lacking, however, is clear evidence of the magnitude of the support.

Given this uncertainty, we shall leave open the question of anchoring while we pursue more detailed information about the nature of church support for Poliquin. However, following the assessment of the *Bangor Daily News*, we classify Poliquin as insurgent and Raye as establishment.

Michigan 4th district

Republican nominee: **John Moolenaar**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 3

Anchor: Informal party organization

Coordination: IPO

Factional types: Top two candidates both establishment.

Political outsider Paul Mitchell spent much of his \$3.6 million campaign budget painting his mainstream opponent in this Republican primary as a career politician, tool of special interests, and – worst of all – secret supporter of Obamacare. The opponent, State Senator John Moolenaar, was not any kind of Obamacare supporter, but he was an establishment insider. Many of the district's employers contributed a Super Pac that permitted unlimited contributions, and Moolenaar's former employer, Dow Corning, alone contributed \$100,000 to his primary campaign. But even so, Moolenaar could raise only \$1.2 million, and Mitchell's frequently unanswered attacks drew blood. In the primary's first public poll, four weeks ahead of the election, Mitchell led Moolenaar by a margin of 23 points, 50 percent to 27 percent. Yet when votes were tallied on Election Day, Moolenaar had pulled ahead to an easy win, beating Mitchell by 53 to 36 percent. A third contender trailed with 11 percent.

How does a candidate reverse a 23-point deficit in a contest in which he is outspent three-to-one?

Four sources gave nearly the same explanation: Bill Shuette. Shuette had represented the city of Midland, the heart of the 4th district, for 30 years. He had been its Congressman, State Senator, and District Judge. In 2014 Schuette was the state's current Attorney General, but he was still watching out for Midland interests. Schuette and the outgoing incumbent agreed early in the contest that Moolenaar would get the informal support of Midland Republicans. And when it appeared that Mitchell, a self-financing newcomer from the edge of the district, might become Midland's Representative in Congress, Schuette jumped personally into the fray. As a journalist summed up the race:

Mitchell was an outsider billionaire from Saginaw who decided 'I want to come in and buy this nomination.' And basically Schuette said, 'I'm not going to allow it to happen.'

And he picked up Moolenaar by the scruff of the neck, carried him across the finish line, plunked him down in the nomination. And that was it.

Well, not quite. Mitchell is only a millionaire, and Shuette is only a leader, not a superhero. As three Republican operatives described it, Moolenaar's comeback was due as much to the political community that rallied to him as to its leadership. We begin with the former.

Midland has a cadre of Republican activists so tight that they are sometimes described as a political machine. But this is a misnomer. The party is better described as an informal organization in which many Republicans are regularly active in politics and work well together. As one source commented, you can drop in on the district's annual party after an absence of 10 years and still know most of the people. There is no boss but a lot of friendship and cooperation.

The Midland political community is also very parochial. “If there was a local guy,” said a source, “[Midlanders] were going to vote for the local guy.” “The fourth district has had a long tradition of trying to stick together and support its candidates,” said another source. Sharing this view, Shuette has “a very strong passion that [the 4th district] seat is a Midland seat and he wants to see a Midlander in that seat.” Explaining, this source went on,

It’s nice to have someone [an officeholder] from Midland who knows the concerns of Midland, keeps an eye out for Midland, who’s going to make sure that Midland’s best interests are looked after first and foremost. Because that’s the hometown team... All other things being equal, [we] want to make sure that Midland gets its fair share, whether it’s highway funds ... or whatever it is that’s being discussed at the federal level.

Getting a tax break for Dow or a loan forgiveness program for students at Northwood University were given as concrete examples of how Midland office holders serve the community. The city’s business and civic leaders naturally appreciate this attitude and work closely with political leaders. One consequence is that Midland candidates normally have plenty of campaign money. Except not in this primary. Mitchell could spend as much money as he needed to spend, which was more than the usual Midland sources generated.

Enter Bill Shuette. As an operative recounted, “Moolenaar did not have the money that his primary opponent had, so we needed to counteract that with something else, and what Bill [Shuette] felt very strongly was that we could have a better ground game.” Moolenaar, as an incumbent state senator, had his own network, but according to our sources, it was Shuette who made the contacts and requests and generally “fired up the troops” to “knock on every Republican door in the district.” Scheutte joined Moolenaar on the campaign bus, appearing so often with him that the two seemed “joined at the hip. They were going all over this district, they were getting press wherever they went...”

Bill knows the district like the back of his hand... he’s represented it his whole life. He knows all the coffee shops and places where people gather to talk politics ... Stan’s Coffee Shop in Mt. Pleasant, that’s where you want to go there, Pizza Sam’s or Charlenes in Midland... each community has one of those places where word gets around.

All in all, “Schuette] was running as hard as John was for that seat to make sure John won,” a source said.

As the election neared, Moolenaar loosed his own advertising barrage, one that highlighted endorsements by local leaders – Schuette and retiring incumbent MC Dave Camp – and blasted Mitchell as an outsider trying to buy the election.

We take no position on which facet of Moolenaar’s campaign – ground game, campaign bus, community networks, or late advertising – turned the race around. Our concern is to identify who was fighting whom and over what.

At first glance, the 4th district primary might have seen a fight about ideology, another chapter in the party’s “civil war” between establishment and insurgent forces. But this is only half right. Mitchell did present himself as an anti-establishment and Tea Party candidate, but the claim was only sound-byte deep. Immediately prior to running in the 4th district primary, Mitchell worked as the Republican party’s state finance chair to raise money for Republican

candidates for state offices. Among the beneficiaries was Moolenaar. A better account of Mitchell's anti-establishment rhetoric was given by another source: "Because Mitchell wasn't in the ingroup, anti-establishment was the card he had to play and he played it." Consistent with this view, Mitchell ran and was elected as an establishment candidate in a neighboring in the next election cycle. We thus view him as an establishment candidate in insurgent's clothing, a common enough type in politics.

The case for Moolenaar as an establishment candidate is much stronger. As we have seen, he received extraordinary support from a political community that in turn worked closely with the district's business and civic leaders on matters of local concern. In our theoretical parlance, the Republican activist community of Midland, is therefore an example of a policy demanding group. Though quite different from the professional associations, chambers of commerce, and ideological PACs in most other races, it is similar to them in this key respect: It is an organized attempt to nominate a candidate who will prioritize representation of the group's particular concerns in Congress.

Republican nominee: **Mike Bishop**

Michigan 8th district.

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Informal party organization

Coordination: Informal party organization

Faction: Bishop, establishment; McMillin, insurgent

Two establishment candidates and one insurgent entered the Republican primary for this safe GOP seat. Concerned that they would split establishment support and permit the insurgent to win, the two establishment candidates made a deal whereby one (Bryan Barnett) dropped out and the other (Mike Bishop) agreed to always take the former's phone calls as an MC and never to run against him for any other elective office. Three party sources told us that, while they had no first-hand knowledge of informal party pressure for one of the establishment candidates to drop out, it would have been normal for leaders to apply pressure in a situation like this one. Another source who did have direct knowledge said Barnett never "felt pressure from anyone who could apply pressure" but realized that pressure from party leaders would eventually become intense if both establishment candidates remained in the race [MI-8_2: 37.30]. Barnett's decision to drop out was in the end, this source said, a personal one based on his wish to remain in his existing office as mayor of a city in the district. Barnett had been in the race for a month and raised about \$100,000 at the point he agreed to drop out. Meanwhile, Bishop secured support from the Republican Main Street PAC, a validation of his establishment credentials.

The insurgent candidate in the race was Tom McMillin. According to Ballotpedia, a group called Independent Party Patriots gave McMillin the highest report card rating of any Michigan state legislator in its most recent rating. Concern that an insurgent might win if he faced two establishment candidates was the reason one of them dropped out.

With Barnett out of the race, top business executives (e.g., CEO's) and business PACs contributed about \$270,000 to Bishop. Calculated in the same way, business gave McMillin about \$50,000. While these figures suggest that business was the anchor of Bishop's campaign, we view party pressure on two party politicians to consolidate the field – which led to elimination of a candidate who might have split the primary vote and allowed the insurgent to win -- as the more important prop for Bishop's campaign since, without it, the anti-establishment candidate could apparently have won.

Michigan 12th district

Democratic nominee: **Debbie Dingell**

Method: Traditional primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Democratic Party establishment

Coordination: Democratic Party

Faction: Top two both establishment

As a candidate in the 12th district of Michigan, Debbie Dingell was the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. She had been an important player in local, state, and national party politics for 15 years, as well as in many other business and civic ventures; even though she had never previously run for electoral office, she had a reputation as a fierce competitor, according to our sources; and she stood near the middle of her party on important issues. The *Detroit Free Press* called her “the most visible and influential spouse in Michigan history.”²⁵ “If you've got a Michigan political issue, at some point, all roads lead through Debbie Dingle,” said a party official.²⁶

From our group-centric perspective, Dingell was a strong candidate because the important groups in her district, labor and the Democratic Party, had seen her in action and believed she would make a good agent for their agendas. Some party stakeholders would have preferred another candidate, but no accomplished candidate declared for the race and sought their support. From this information we assess that Dingell’s campaign was anchored broadly in her party establishment.

At least one potentially strong candidate considered a run, but a source told us that EMILY’s List discouraged this candidate from running, thereby leaving Dingell to an easy win. This information suggests coordination,

Yet Dingell’s easy victory can also be seen as an example of what many political scientists would call candidate-centered politics, and what a Downsian might call the triumph of median politics. So why should the group-centric view be the preferred frame for understanding this race?

Attention to Dingell’s individual strengths, as in the candidate-centered view, is not misplaced. We therefore acknowledge that, for this case, the group-centric approach has no special explanatory value. Dingell’s ascendancy happened too quickly and too seamlessly for its key processes – search for an agent, vetting, anchoring, coordination – to be visible and hence available for analysis. The value of the group-centric approach must depend on other cases in which these key processes can be observed and thence add to understanding. Hence the

²⁵ quoted in “Dingell’s powerful wife: Bridge between Michigan and DC.” Teddy Davis. June 6, 2005. Politico. Downloaded August 31, 2022.

²⁶ Ibid.

Dingell case does little to strengthen or to weaken either the group-centric nor politician-centered view.

Dingell got 70 percent of the vote against her sole opponent, Raymond Mullins, an attorney who spent only \$8,000 on his campaign. Mullins was a former president of a local chapter of the NAACP and the founder of a group called "Loyal Opposition to the Status Quo." The following is from an MLive feature on Mullins:

"She is inheriting the seat from John [Dingell] and I don't think that's right," [Mullins] said, adding he believes Dingell and her husband are too conservative and haven't done enough to fight for equal rights for all people, including the black community...

"I have a proven record of trying to address some of the societal ills in our community," said Mullins, who served 12 years as president of the Ypsilanti-Willow Run NAACP, where he says he fought for educational opportunities for black youths.

"The bottom line is I'm pissed because I don't think she's interested in solving some of these issues," Mullins said of Dingell, noting she's [on the board of governors](#) for Wayne State University, where black enrollment is [about 18 percent](#). "I don't think she has a record of doing anything for people in this area."²⁷

On balance, Mullins seems, in his term, more "loyal opposition" than insurgent.

²⁷ "Ypsilanti attorney plans to run against Debbie Dingell for Congress." Ryan Stanton. MLive April 7, 2014. https://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/2014/04/ypsilanti_attorney_plans_to_ta.html . Accessed September 5, 2022.

Michigan 14th district

Democratic nominee: **Brenda Lawrence**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: EMILY's List (for Lawrence)

Coordination: IPO (for Hobbs)

Factions: Hobbs, establishment; Lawrence, insurgent

This is a fuller case study than appears in the article text.

The 14th district is 57 percent African American, five percent Hispanic, and overwhelmingly Democratic. It has the form of a giant squiggle that is so distended that driving from one end of the district to the other requires crossing in and out of the district 12 times (MI-1; 6.50). The district is also economically diverse, including the poorest sections of urban Detroit, middle class and heavily African American suburbs around Detroit, and the state's richest suburb, Grosse Pointe, at the eastern edge of the district.

More than half of the district's eligible voters reside in the heavily black and poor inner city of Detroit (MI-4; 19:00). Strong political machines once controlled this territory, but have withered into non-significance. Inner city Detroit has so little sway in 14th district politics that a white candidate from the Grosse Pointe section of the district won the House seat in 2012. That candidate, Gary Peters, resigned to run for the U.S. Senate in 2014, setting off a scramble to replace him. A dozen or so candidates considered running, but only four formally entered the contest.

The main contender from inner city Detroit was Hansen Clarke, who had served one term in Congress from a differently gerrymandered version of the district. Clarke finished third with 31 percent of the vote in 2014 primary, which was about five percentage points behind the winner. This performance was notable because Clarke entered the race at the last minute and, according to multiple sources, made little effort to campaign or raise money. Clarke "just disappeared" from the campaign, said a friend. (MI-8; 20:50). "I don't think his heart was in it," said another (MI-6; 20:0). Clarke's voting strength was apparently a carryover from previous service, which included terms in the state Senate and House. Two sources made the obvious point that Clarke probably could have won if he had put more effort into the race (MI-1; 12:30; MI-4; 26:50).

But it is not so easy to mount a campaign in the Detroit section. Another Detroit politician, State Senator Bert Johnson, started to campaign and wound up dropping out after raising only \$100,000 (MI-8; 11:50). Johnson, an African American, had served seven years in the state legislature and held important leadership posts, but he could make little headway with groups and donors in the more prosperous suburban section of the district (MI-8; 13:40). However, Johnson was also handicapped by a prior felony conviction and an overhang of penalties from

the Federal Election Commission in a previous race. Two years after the nomination contest, Johnson went to jail on a political corruption charge.

In the absence of a strong bid from the Detroit section of the district, two candidates from suburban Oakland County, both African Americans, were the top finishers in the 14th district contest. One was Rudy Hobbs, a second-term member of the Michigan House. The other was Brenda Lawrence, a four-term mayor of Southfield, a largely African American suburb. We deal first with Hobbs and his support groups.

Political organization in the suburban section of the district is dense but not centrally controlled. A source described Democratic politics in terms of its “stakeholders,” as follows:

A lot of stakeholders are people who currently or formerly held office, those that currently hold a position of leadership within labor organizations, those that live and breathe Democratic politics that are involved in the congressional or county Democratic parties or their local clubs, but a lot of times it’s basically people that ... write big checks.... or have influence over who contribute. MI-5, 56:50)

Hobbs had connections to these stakeholders. He had been an assistant party leader in the state Assembly, a staffer for a Democratic governor a lieutenant governor, a fundraiser for local party office holders, and the campaign manager for several campaigns. He won the support of the district’s Democratic Party committee, 14 local political groups, most local office holders and most unions. The union support involved important cues to voters, along with substantial monetary and volunteer help.

But our sources mentioned five other capable Democrats who ranked higher in seniority than Hobbs and who tried but failed to get the party and union support that Hobbs got. Two sources complained that Hobbs had jumped the pecking order.

The key to Hobbs’ success, mentioned by every one of our eight sources and highlighted by several, was a neighboring white Congressman, Sandy Levin. Levin’s brother, U.S. Senator Carl Levin, was sometimes credited as well, but most sources named just Sandy. Said a source,

Sandy Levin has done more for the Dem. Party in Michigan in last 50 years than anyone else... he’s a party builder... So Sandy has a lot of friends, a lot of relationships, a lot of ability to pull support.

Sandy Levin ... in many ways is still the Oakland County chair [and] the state party chair (MI-1; 4.50 & 29.20)

Levin, said this source, was “all in” for Hobbs – “financially, politically, personal time and care, staff attention” (MI-1; 30.30).

Hobbs, said another source, “hadn’t gone through any gone of the traditional chairs” -- that is, hadn’t come up through the party hierarchy -- “no dues paid, no basis for his involvement in the race -- except the Levin family” (MI-7; 17.20).

Hobbs acknowledged the importance of Levin’s support and even boasted of it. He spoke of himself as a person who had come up through Levin’s ranks and would emulate his mentor’s party-building methods. He also used the Levin connection as part of an argument for his inevitability as a candidate. Said a source:

Rudy came across as the establishment candidate, and that’s the way he was running, ‘I’m the favorite of unions, I’m Sandy Levin’s guy, and I’ve got the most money’ ... That’s the way he chose to run the campaign. (MI-4; 29.30)

Brenda Lawrence rose in politics by another path. After serving on the Mayfield city council, she beat the incumbent mayor in 2001 and was easily re-elected three times. But her reputation as a vote-getter was damaged when she ran in 2012 for nomination for the open 14th district House seat and was soundly beaten by the Levin-backed white candidate, Gary Peters. “People [in 2014] had seen Brenda perform in the previous election and frankly were not impressed with her ability to raise money and do the organization things that were needed,” said a source 9 (4; 7.30; also MI-3; 46.25). There were also substantive concerns. One of our sources called her “a very effective” mayor (MI-4; 26.00). But unions distrusted her for her support, over their objection, for construction of a Walmart in Southfield (MI-1; 86.30), and two sources from urban Detroit disparaged her as “ceremonial mayor” in a city run by its professional manager (MI-6; 15.30; MI-8 40.10).

Lawrence got off to a strong start in the 2014 race, raising more money in the first quarter of her campaign than she had in all of 2012, according the FEC data. Then she caught a big break when EMILY’s List (EL) decided to back her. This brought Lawrence direct and indirect help with fundraising, a flood of volunteers to knock doors and make phone calls, and expert help on several fronts, especially canvassing.

Even with EL’s help, Lawrence was able to spend only \$464,000 to Hobbs’ \$654,000. But EL gave Lawrence the edge in direct voter contact. For his ground game, Hobbs’ relied on union regulars who were older, often retired, and poorly motivated, according to several sources.

In the heyday, when the unions had tons of members and they were flush with money, I’m sure it [their field operation] was a sight to see, a thing of beauty. But in the last 10 years we don’t have that. They will organize one weekend, like one or two Saturdays before the election, and they will “lit drop”... meaning [canvassers] are not knocking and waiting for someone to talk to and sending the message ... They’re either putting [the literature] in the newspaper box or just leaving it in the door. (MI-5; 76.20)

Said a source with campaign experience, “The worst thing I can hear is ‘Labor is going to walk for you on Saturday’ ... There’s really no conversation at the door. It’s knock and drop [campaign literature].” (MI-2; 17:40).

Canvassers organized by EL tended, by contrast, to be idealistic college women excited to be doing important work. They were, moreover, trained by EL “to do actual real door knocking” rather than just literature drops (MI-1; 54:40).

Perhaps more important than Lawrence’s door-knockers were her phone canvassers. Michigan law allows persons over age 60 to vote by mail ballot and these voters are identifiable from registration lists. The Lawrence campaign treated these voters like sitting ducks.

It was very targeted, repeated contact... it was the phone that was able to get them over and over again [up to eight times]. With dialing technology ... and dozens of people doing it, you can accomplish that. And that’s why hundreds of thousands of people were called. It’s not that hundreds of thousands of different people were called, sometimes they were the same absentee voters ... they hadn’t turned in their ballot, they had said ‘oh maybe,’ and so they just kept getting positive messages from Brenda Lawrence — they either voted against us because they were annoyed, or they finally relented and said ‘Ok, I give up, I’ll vote for you. (MI-5; 71.1)

According to another source, half or more of ballots cast in Democratic are typically absentee. Phone banking, he added, was a weakness for Hobbs and a strength for Lawrence. (MI-5; 9.0 and 10.30)

The importance of absentee ballots became clear in the vote counting. Hobbs appeared the winner on election night, but late discovery of a cache of uncounted absentee ballots from the Detroit section of the district gave Lawrence a narrow win.²⁸

Several of our sources credited EMILY’s List for Lawrence’s win. “EMILY’s List basically took over that campaign... and it was through their organizational and financial muscle ... that Brenda pulled it out,” said one source (MI-4; 8.10) “Not a chance” Lawrence would have won without EMILY’s List,” said one another (MI-8; 36:00). EL “was the biggest difference maker in the race,” said a third (MI-1; 50.10).

The political campaign was not lacking discussion of issues. Lawrence highlighted the concerns of women; Hobbs spoke about damage to the community from guns; Clarke talked about student loan debt. But these were differences of emphasis rather than differences in issue

²⁸ I have tried to verify this interview information but have been unable to. Newspapers did not report it the Michigan Secretary of State website contains nothing about it. I sent an inquiry to the SoS office, but it hasn’t responded. Need to get this done.

position. As a roundup article in the *Detroit Free Press* stated, “There was little difference between the candidates on issues.”²⁹ Our sources concurred. As one put it,

... the election was personality and supporter driven, not message or ideologically driven. This was no battle for the heart and soul of the Democratic Party. This was about ... who is the best person to advocate for the Democratic Party.” (MI-5; 45.30)

The loss to Lawrence strung Levin and the unions. “It’s very rare and humbling for this to happen on a race this big,” said a source (MI-1; 41:40). Two sources reported rumblings that unions might even contest Lawrence’s re-nomination in 2016 (MI-1; 89.20; MI-2; 16.40). No such challenge emerged, but relations between Lawrence and the unions were cool, perhaps even strained in the aftermath of the race

Feelings in Inner city Detroit were also a bit low. A few decades back, urban Detroit was the dominant bloc in two congressional districts. Now it was part of just one district and, though it was home to more Democrats than suburban Oakland County, two Oakland Democrats each won more votes than the Detroit Democrat. Urban Detroit’s weakness was, to be sure, due to lack of effort by its candidate and its own low voter turnout, but no matter. When asked why Hobbs wouldn’t have made an acceptable Representative, a prominent Detroit activist said, “Because, first of all, Sandy Levin picked Rudy Hobbs to run” (MI-6; 14.20). And Lawrence? She was a not particularly capable “ceremonial mayor” from the suburbs, a person whose thinking would not be focused on Detroit [MI-6; 15:30]. “So when you’re thinking about representation from the 14th district, people in Detroit want somebody from Detroit (MI-6; 29.00).

The final vote in the primary was 36 percent for Lawrence, 32 percent for Hobbs, 31 percent for Clarke, and 1 percent for a vanity candidate. It is important to note that, despite its political disorganization, inner city Detroit might still have controlled this outcome. Clarke might have run a more vigorous campaign than he did. Vincent Gregory, a third strong African American from the suburbs, entered the race but dropped out after union support went overwhelmingly to Hobbs [MI-5; 27:00]; if Gregory had been able to mount a credible campaign, he might have so fractured the suburban vote that Clarke would have won despite lackadaisical effort. Brenda Lawrence, who was reportedly not EL’s first choice, might have failed to get their nod. “There were a couple of women from Detroit that [EL] really liked,” said a source. If either one had agreed to run, “she’d be the congresswoman right now” (MI-1; 43.00). Reflecting this fluidity in the politics of the 14th congressional district, a source commented,

Politics is not about best qualified. It’s not about most experienced. Going to work for NASA is. Driving an Indy Car really is. Being MVP in the NBA probably is... Politics is a completely different type of full contact sport. Anybody can win it. (MI-8; 29:50)

Summary

²⁹ “Hobbs, Lawrence in Tough U.S. House Battle,” Kathleen Gray, *Detroit Free Press*, August 6, 2014, P. A10.

The differences that mattered in this race were differences in the preferences and skills of the organized players. For EMILY's List, the paramount goal was to elect more women to Congress. For the Sanders faction, it was to get a DC representative with whom they had a working relationship. The first signified insurgency, the second establishment. Lawrence and EL won in large part because their younger, better-trained, and better-directed team of volunteers out-campaigned the opposition. Hansen Clarke and one or two women politicians from inner city Detroit were in a position to upset this scenario, but they passed on it. So as the race played out, there were two potential support coalitions and the more effective of them got the candidate it wanted. Women and the citizens of Southfield (population 71,000) were beneficiaries of this configuration of forces; union members and the residents of inner city Detroit (population circa 375,000) were left to hope for better luck when the seat next came open.

Minnesota 6th district

Republican nominee: **Tom Emmer**

Method: Traditional primary following endorsement convention

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: District Republican Party

Coordination: Local Republican Party

Faction: Top two both establishment.

The story of Emmer's victory in the Republican primary of the Minnesota 6th district begins in the 1990s. At that time Minnesota had a system in which locally elected delegates attend district and statewide conventions to endorse candidates ahead party primaries, but the party endorsement meant little. The candidate who got it would tout it, but she would still usually need to fight and win a tough primary. But this changed after an unusually contentious gubernatorial primary in 1996. The new state party chair, Bill Cooper, brought intraparty warfare to a virtual halt with a declaration that henceforth the party would support its convention-endorsed candidates with as much money as necessary to crush anyone who dared run against them. The declaration was soon challenged in a high-profile legislative contest that was won decisively by the party-endorsed candidate. Over the next 10 years and four party chairs, the Cooper policy prevailed as the Republicans Party effectively made the most of its nominations through convention endorsements. Primaries might still be contested, but the convention backed candidates nearly always won.

Cooper was unusual in the Minnesota GOP of the 1990s. He was an executive in a major regional bank at a time when few high level business people were willing to dive into the nitty gritty of party politics. As such, he had close relations with the business leaders who traditionally funded Republican candidates and was therefore positioned to bring party and business into close alignment. Republicans, as he told both groups, ought to refrain from wasting money fighting each other in primaries and focus instead on beating Democrats in general elections.

The Cooper policy benefited all kinds of candidates – moderates, conservatives, religious activists and, beginning in the 2000s, libertarians. The party supported even candidates who won convention endorsements against incumbent office holders. The system frayed significantly in the 2010s with development of a rift between Liberty and establishment conservatives, but remained intact.

This was the system in which Emmer rose. Elected to the state Assembly in 2004, he was a legislative back bencher known for fiery speeches and the aggressive style one would expect from the college hockey player he had been. In 2010 he jumped the party pecking order by running for the party's gubernatorial nomination in a field that included his current boss, the party's legislative leader in the state Assembly. Though Emmer was little known even in activist circles before running, he won the party convention's endorsement, whereupon his opponent followed the party norm by dropping out of the race and leaving Emmer to an easy primary win.

Emmer lost the general gubernatorial election in 2010, but remained politically active.

When the 5th district seat came open, he quickly declared his candidacy and again won a district party convention endorsement. One of his opponents then dropped out and the other was unable to raise money and was crushed by Emmer in the voter primary. All in all, Emmer's House nomination in 2014 was a straightforward case of coordination between party activists and business donors – the two key groups in many state parties – to make efficient use of party resources, exactly as intended by the Cooper policy. Emmer's entire political career was anchored in this system.

Emmer's primary opponent was Rhonda Sivarajah, who had led a Republican takeover of her county board of supervisors and the enactment of numerous conservative reforms. Her record, however, is that of an inside player and establishment conservative.

Montana at large

Republican nominee: **Ryan Zinke**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 5

Anchor: Veterans

Coordination: None

Factions: Top two both establishment

Ryan Zinke, a retired highly decorated Navy SEAL, organized military veterans into a Super PAC called Special Operations for America (SOFA) to oppose Barack Obama's reelection in 2012.³⁰ According to FEC, the group spent \$81,000 for this purpose. In 2014, the group turned to Congressional elections, stating on its website that "Fifty years ago veterans represented almost 80% of the Congressional body, today it is 19 percent. SOFA is committed to sending proven and battle tested leadership to Washington."

According to OpenSecrets, SOFA spent \$457,000, including an expenditure of \$175,000 in support of Zinke and another \$17,000 in opposition to one of Zinke's opponents, Mathew Rosendale. The FEC reports somewhat different values for these independent expenditures, \$205,000 and \$47,000.³¹

These figures may be a significant understatement of Zinke's support from veterans. He spent much of the campaign crisscrossing the country to speak at fundraisers and was quoted in a local paper as saying that "a lot" of the money he was raising was coming from veterans.³² Zinke was still chairman of SOFA during much of this time. Overall, Zinke raised 67 percent of his individual contributions, a total of \$437,000, from out of state. We assume that much of this money came from veterans in fundraisers around the country.

Zinke was also still chairman of SOFA for part of the time he was getting direct expenditures from it. The Campaign Legal Center and Democracy filed a complaint with the FEC over this matter, but it had not been resolved as of August, 2022. Most of SOFA's expenditures for Zinke appear to have been at the end of the campaign, when he was no longer chair

Special Operations for America continued to make large contributions to veterans in the election cycles through 2022, according to OpenSecrets.

³⁰ This account is based in significant part on "A Case Study of the 2014 Congressional Republican Primary for Montana's At-Large District," by Angela Yip in PS 191C in Spring quarter 2016. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix.

³¹ Accessed August 23, 2022. We are puzzled by the discrepancy between the FEC and OpenSecrets numbers.

³² "U.S. House candidate Ryan Zinke has received \$116,000 from Fla.insurance company employees, execs." Charles Johnson, *The Missoulian*, March 22, 2014.

These data support the conclusion that veterans were an anchor of Zinke 2014 House campaign.

In media coverage of the race, neither Zinke or the second place finisher, Corey Stapleton, exhibited any indications of insurgency. Zinke was singled out in several articles as the most liberal candidate in the race, while Stapleton, when asked to describe his credentials, said he was a problem solver who would read budget legislation carefully and strive to represent Montanans.³³

³³ "U.S. House candidate Stapleton says he's ready for 'difficult problems,'" [Charles S. Johnson](#), *The Missoulian*. April 22, 2014. Downloaded September 30, 2022.

New Jersey 1st district

Democratic nominee: **Donald Norcross**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 3

Anchor: unions (group)

Coordination: County party committees

Factions: Top two both establishment

As described in the text, three party committees endorsed Norcross, which gave him the 'county line' and thus the near certainty of winning the party nomination. But the Democratic party committees were dominated by local unions. "Donald is the union movement, and the union movement and Democratic politics are nearly always hand-in-hand," a source told us [NJ-05 P. 4].

It is then a question whether, in this situation, Norcross needed the county committees and their county lines to prevail. In light of the union support he received – one thousand workers knocked doors ahead of the elections and a union-run phone bank plugged for him – he might have won over a party-backed candidate and would surely have had a chance to do so, .i.e, would have been viable.

All this raises the question of whether the anchoring group here should be viewed as the party committees which bestowed the county lines or the group (unions) that dominated party committees in the district and might have been able to get Norcross through the primaries by themselves? Our rule in such cases will be that the group that first conveys support sufficient for viability should be considered the campaign's first anchor, which from the preceding account would be the unions rather than the party.

At the same time, the party committees play a coordinating role because, though dominated by the unions, they likely contained some non-union interests that worked together rather than against one another due to their common membership on the party committees.

Final point: there were no insurgent themes in the campaigns of the top two candidates.

New Jersey 3rd district

Republican nominee: **Tom MacArthur**

Method: Primary, with “county line” ballot

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: County party committees

Coordination: Local party

Factions: MacArthur, establishment; Lonigan, insurgent.

Party organization in New Jersey was the most consistently strong in the PoG study. The main reason was an electoral institution called the “party line,” a rule that permits the county committees of each party to provide their endorsed candidates with preferential ballot placement in the primary. Except for high-profile races, candidates on the county line essentially always win their primaries. A second pillar of party strength is that the candidates endorsed by party committees end up controlling county government, which is a major source of contracts and government jobs. Those seeking this patronage constitute a classic type of party stakeholder, the benefit seeker. To get their cut, they do voter contact for party candidates in elections, further strengthening party power. It’s the same in both parties except for the benefits involved – union contracts on the Democratic side, legal work and construction on the GOP side.

With this as background, we turn to the Republican primary in the 3rd New Jersey district. The district consists of two counties, Ocean and Burlington, and two party committees that do not always work together when interests collide. When the 3rd district House seat they share came open in 2008, each committee put up its own candidate in a fierce primary fight, result of which was that the exhausted Republican winner lost to the Democrat in the general election. Then in 2010 they coordinated on a nominee and took back the seat in the general election. The lesson learned from these two contests was still fresh in Republican memories in 2014: Fight and we lose, coordinate and we win.

There was plenty of opportunity for coordination in the 2014 House primary. By various counts, 15 to 17 would-be candidates sought endorsement by the Ocean and Burlington Republican committees, but one candidate stood out: Steve Lonigan. As the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in a 2013 special election, Lonigan lost to Cory Booker by a margin of 44 to 55 percent, but he had earlier won the party primary by a margin of 80 to 20 percent and polls showed that he was still popular with 3rd district Republican voters. Lonigan was also wealthy and prepared to self-fund his primary campaign.

Yet in the eyes of the Ocean and Burlington Republican committees, Lonigan had a glaring flaw: He was a principled anti-government conservative. Among other positions, he had opposed federal aid for victims of Hurricane Sandy and supported closure of a local military base to reduce the federal budget deficit. These positions might go down well with a segment of the GOP base, but they would be poison in the general election. And the damage could be long lasting. An unabashed conservative on the county line could tarnish the reputation for moderation that the party needed to keep control of county government in the deep purple New Jersey 3rd. If this control were lost for even one cycle, the party’s campaign muscle –

campaign workers with government jobs, contractors, and business donors – might melt away, never to return. In this context, Lonegan’s candidacy for federal office was an issue of local politics. “Who the candidate for Congress is matters to us and Steve Lonegan is too extreme,” said a local party official, adding that “everything comes down to the courthouse ... [and how it] affects your local county bi-elections”

The Ocean and Burlington Republican committees have elaborate endorsement procedures, but the key players are the committee chairs. “A lot of people ... they’ve elected the county chairman, if the county chairman says this is the best candidate, a lot of people are willing to say, ‘OK, that’s why we elected you. .. He knows more than I do,’ ” said a party insider.

The Ocean and Burlington party chairs favored Tom MacArthur, another wealthy businessman able to fund his own campaign, and the party committees went along. All of the non-endorsed candidates promptly dropped out – except for Lonegan, who blasted the Ocean Republican Committee that had just given him only three votes of the 126 cast for the endorsement. As he told a local journalist after the vote:

What you saw was the establishment picking an establishment candidate. This district is going to become the poster child for establishment Republicans trying to push out conservatives. I have the polling. It’s in my favor. In the end, the only polling that matters is what happens on June 3rd [election day].”³⁴

MacArthur’s backers on the party committees were aware of the polls but weren’t worried. MacArthur had the county line, all the money he needed for advertising, and the prospect of a strong ground campaign. As a party source explained, the committee endorsement brings ... instant grass roots volunteer base, structural support, endorsements from throughout all these towns. ... Whereas, someone like Lonegan needs to build his own outside of that.

Notwithstanding the early polling, the McArthur got a 60-40 win.

Moreso than most races with insurgent candidates, this one truly was about ideology – but only half about it. Lonegan cared about principle and was willing to pay a price for it. But in the other half, the concern was maintenance of material benefit. No doubt both sides also cared about the balance of factional power in the GOP. So to our minds, the factional conflict frame captures the stakes of this primary as well or better than does a frame of ideological conflict.

³⁴ “CD3 Primary: Ocean County Republicans award the line to MacArthur,” Max Pizarro. *The Observer Online*. March 19, 2014. Downloaded 12/28/2020.

New Jersey 12th district

Democratic nominee: **Bonnie Watson Coleman**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: Members of party committee from Trenton

Coordination: Party

Factions: Top two both establishment

Bonnie Watson was 70 years old and planning retirement from a four-decade career in public service when the New Jersey 12th district seat came open. She was initially disinclined to start a new career in Congress, but pressure from friends and a political operative named James Gee changed her mind. The key to that mind change, according to Gee, was an early endorsement from the Progressive Change Campaign Committee (PCCC). As the daughter of a well-known Trenton leader and a career politician herself, Watson Coleman could count on the support of party committee members the African American community in Trenton even before she declared her candidacy. The PCCC endorsement enabled her to attract the support of party committee liberals from Princeton Township, thereby creating a majority for her candidacy among members of the Mercer County Democratic Committee. That support in turn gave her the county line on the Mercer County primary ballot that was essential to her viability.

This story seems straightforward enough. But for classification purposes, we need to decide which of the actors in the story were responsible for conveying viability and hence anchors of Watson Coleman's campaign. One could argue that her support among party committee members from the African American precincts of Mercer County was sufficient to give her a chance (i.e., viability) for nomination. Or one could argue that African American support alone in a majority white district was insufficient for viability and that only the endorsement of the Mercer Party Democratic Committee conveyed viability. Or one could view the endorsement of the PCCC – which entailed little money but critical validation of Watson Coleman's chance for a winning coalition – as the support that made her viable. Our rule in such cases will be that the group that first conveys viability will be viewed as the anchor, which, as we think, was probably the Mercer County Committee

Emily's List made no endorsement in this race, probably because Watson Coleman's principal opponent was a woman. Watson Coleman was certainly a progressive, but as a former state party chair in New Jersey, she should not be viewed as an insurgent. The other candidate, Linda Greenstein, was likewise an establishment union-backed candidate.

New York 4th district (Democrat)

Republican nominee: **Kathleen Rice**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: DCCC

Coordination: DCCC

Factions: Top two both establishment

The 4th New York district has an active, patronage-oriented party committee, but the committee made no endorsement in the open seat primary in 2014. This was unusual in Long Island politics and especially so in light of the fact that the county party had recruited Rice to her current position as county prosecutor. The lack of endorsement was apparently due to Rice's refusal to seek indictment against a Republican official for an alleged campaign violation, which angered the Democratic party leader. However, the DCCC stepped in to endorse Rice and add her to the party's Red to Blue Program, moves that conferred instant viability and marked her an establishment candidate. Her opponent, Kevan Abrahams, was described as an African American with cross-over appeal to whites in conservative Nassau County, which marks him as establishment as well.

New York 4th district (Republican)

Republican nominee: **Bruce Blakeman**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Nassau County Republican Committee

Coordination: Nassau County Republican Committee

Factions: Blakeman establishment; Scaturro, insurgent.

Blakeman was formally endorsed by the Nassau County Republican Party Committee, a contracts and patronage oriented organization. Its endorsement gained him the support of the party's army of canvassers, which was estimated by sources to vary between 500 and 1,500 street walkers. Our source told us that endorsement decisions by this party committee are made by the party boss. We emailed the boss to request an interview but he did not respond.

As the endorsee of a patronage and contracts oriented local party, Blakeman should be considered an establishment candidate.

The second candidate in the race, Frank Scaturro. Coverage of the race said little about his political views except that he was an "outsider." However, one of our sources said that Scaturro was a "far right" tea party candidate and another source that he was an "intellectual tea party type" who had no chance to win. "Just one guy screaming," source said.

New York 21st district (Democrat)

Democratic nominee: **Aaron Woolf**

Method: Primary

Number of primary candidates: 1

Anchor: County party committee

Coordination: County party committee

Faction: Establishment

According to news reports, the chairs of the district's 12 Democratic party committees met for a full day to consider a list of 12 potential candidates for possible endorsement in the Democratic primary. There was little prior public campaign and the candidate eventually chosen was a film maker from Brooklyn whom few in the district knew. As the *Post Star* headlined on the day of the endorsement, "Local Dems Surprised, but Happy, with Woolf." One local activist commented, "I've heard there was a really strong candidate — we didn't know who it was — that was in the works and had a lot of money. I assume that this was him."

³⁵

Two candidates expressed interest in running against the party endorsed candidate, but one dropped out and the other failed to get the 1,250 signatures necessary to qualify for the primary ballot.

True to his promise, Woolfe spent \$800,000 of his own money and raised \$1.2 million more for the fall election, but got only 33 percent of the vote against Republican Elise Stefanik.

³⁵ "Democrats react to endorsement, as candidate remains mum." Maury Thompson, *Post Star*, February 14, 2014.

New York 21st district (Republican)

Republican nominee: **Elise Stefanik**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 2

Anchor: Republican Party establishment

Coordination: Party Committee

Faction: Top two both establishment

We were unable to visit this upstate district in New York's "North Country," but the *Post-Star* newspaper provided excellent coverage of the primary and we rely on its reporting in our account. Coverage began with the following headline and story in July 2013, nearly a year ahead of the primary

Potential challengers to Owens exploring run

A businesswoman from Willsboro who worked at the White House during the Bush administration is touring the 21st Congressional District as she considers seeking the Republican nomination to challenge U.S. Rep. Bill Owens, D-Plattsburgh, next year.

"I'm concerned about the direction of this country," said Elise Stefanik, who works in sales, marketing and management for Premium Plywood Products, a company headquartered in Guilderland Center that her family owns.³⁶

Stefanik had earned a BA from Harvard, worked in the George Bush White House, and helped in Paul Ryan's vice-presidential campaign. She was also close to GOP guru Karl Rove.

The 12 counties in the 21st district each had an active Republican Party committee. The procedure is for each county committee to interview candidates for partisan offices and to make a recommendation to their county chair, all 12 of whom then get together to vote an official party endorsement for each race. The rules stipulate that committee members who wish to support someone other than the official party candidate must give up their party posts in order to do so.

Stefanik campaigned in the 12 counties, focusing almost exclusively on party leaders and their power of endorsement. Judging from *Post-Star* reporting, she was the most active candidate in the race. A late December 2013 story reported s Stefanik boast:

Stefanik said Thursday she has spent many months meeting with Republican committee members and community leaders throughout the district.

³⁶ Maury Thompson. *Post-Star*, July 20, 2013. Internet edition, downloaded August, 2018.

"I've been to every county multiple times. And I'm the only candidate who has made that a priority," she said.

Stefanik said she looks forward to the endorsement process.

"I think it's great that the chairs are having an open process, so that anyone who is interested and filed (a candidacy statement with the Federal Election Commission) can throw their hat in the ring."³⁷

This attitude made a generally favorable impression. The *Post-Star* noted in particular that GOP leaders "said that Stefanik's connections in Washington make her a credible candidate."³⁸ Based in significant part on these connections, Stefanik could boast in early 2014 that she had raised \$250,000. Probably not by coincidence, the Democratic incumbent decided about this time to retire, making the race one for an open seat.

An article in the *Watertown Times* provided some detail on Stefanik's national connections:

Ms. Stefanik was one of a "handful" of House candidates who attended a weekend meeting in Aspen, Colo., called by Republican billionaire Paul Singer. The conference was to discuss individual party candidates at several levels. The goal of the group is to more carefully direct contributions to individual candidates, rather than just providing money to super political action committees based on general political philosophies.

"These are top-tier fundraisers and donors who are looking to rethink party structure," Ms. Stefanik said Monday. "They're looking for the ideal candidates to carry the party's banner into the elections."³⁹

Looking forward to the February meeting at which the party would make its endorsement, the regional GOP leader told the *Post-Star*, "We will be meeting as a group of chairs and hopefully we can come out with a single candidate to be the endorsed Republican candidate at that time... Hopefully someone will be head and shoulders above the rest and everyone will like the same candidate," he said. "It probably won't happen, but it makes life easier, from my perspective."⁴⁰

³⁷ "Field getting crowded in 21st District." Maury Thompson. *Post-Star*. December 29, 2013.

³⁸ "Willsboro Republican, Elise Stefanik, starts campaign for Owens' seat." Maury Thompson. *Post-Star*, August 6, 2013.

³⁹ "STEFANIK SEEKS NATIONAL DONORS HOUSE RACE: DOHENY FOCUSES LOCALLY LEADING UP TO PRIMARY. By Perry White. *Watertown Times*. March 4, 2014. Downloaded 7/2/22.

⁴⁰ "GOP chairmen in 21st District to hold Feb. 5 endorsement meeting." *Post-Star*. December 12, 2013.

The North County Republican Party had the same establishment-Tea Party divide that much of the national GOP had, but the *Times* quoted a source as saying that the rift was manageable:

... the Republican Party has become more adept at controlling the competing factions within its base now that the Tea Party movement is a few years old.

"If they want a single nominee, they can get it," Mr. Schmitt said.⁴¹

As it turned out, 11 of 12 county chairs favored Stefanik. However, two of the snubbed candidates indicated that they would run in the voter primary to follow. As the *Post-Star* wrote:

The endorsement clears the way for the party establishment to provide Stefanik with financial and volunteer support in the Republican primary, in which she will have at least two challengers for the party's nomination.⁴²

A third candidate, Matt Doheny, soon entered the race. He was the Republican who had failed twice before to beat the Democratic incumbent and wanted another run for Congress now that the seat was open. An early poll found Doheny ahead of Stefanik 48 percent to 13 percent among 350 likely Republican primary voters.⁴³

By June, the Republican primary had narrowed to two candidates, Stefanik and Doheny. One of the dropouts was Michael Ring, a Tea Party candidate who reported raising only \$5,500. The *Post-Star's* endorsement editorial began as follows:

In separate editorial board meetings with Republican candidates Matt Doheny and Elise Stefanik, we asked each of them to plot where they stand ideologically on a simple graph with far left on one side and far right on the other. Both marked a spot on the graph halfway between moderate and far right conservative...

If you are looking for a Second Amendment-defending, Obamacare-repealing, climate change-denying candidate, then local Republicans will be comfortable with their choices in the June 24 Republican primary. They are far more alike than they are different, and both are taking traditional Republican stands on the issues.⁴⁴

This passage indicates that both Stefanik and Doheny were establishment candidates. But despite this similarity, the primary was an expensive one. Doheny spent near \$800,000 and Stefanik \$1.8 million, including an independent expenditure of \$350,000 from a SuperPAC

⁴¹ "GOP FIELD RALLIES; STEFANIK STONG DISTRICT 21 RACE: THREE REPUBLICANS CURRENTLY IN RUNNING." By Daniel Flatley. Watertown Times. May 29, 2014. Downloaded 7/2/22

¹⁸ "Stefanik receives Republican endorsement." Muary Thompson. *Post-Star*. February 7, 2014.

¹⁹ "Ibid.

⁴⁴ "ENDORSEMENT: Doheny will hit ground running in 21st Congressional District." *Post-Star* endorsement. June 21, 2014. Downloaded August 2018.

involving national Republican donors. With a large spending advantage and the GOP endorsement, Stefanik easily overcame Doheny's early poll advantage for a 61 to 39 percent win in the primary.

In our accounting, Stefanik profited by both the coordinated support of the district 12 GOP committees and from anchoring by national Republican donors (e.g., Paul Singer). She also profited from a "Young Gun" designation by the RNCC, one of six candidates supported by the RNCC in our 33 WOSP primaries and a likely cue to the party's national donors. We shall call the combination of party influences Republican Party establishment.

North Carolina 6th district

Republican nominee: **Mark Walker**

Method: Party primary with runoff

Number of primary candidates: 9

Anchor: Religious conservatives (group)

Coordination: None

Factions: Walker, insurgent; Berger, establishment

Mark Walker, the music minister of a large Baptist church and a political neophyte, kicked off the primary for this heavily Republican seat in March 2013 by announcing that he would oppose the 30-year incumbent Republican, Howard Coble. When Coble announced six months later that he would retire, eight more candidates entered the competition.

The frontrunner in this nine-candidate field was Phil Berger, Jr. Though a little-known county attorney, he was also the son of the senior Philip Berger, president Pro-Tem of the North Carolina Senate and one of the most influential Republicans in the state. Father helped son to tap into the father's network for endorsements and campaign funds, including a Super PAC created by the senior Berger's friends in alleged violation of campaign rules. The junior Berger's campaign was thus anchored in the senior Berger's state senate network. We take this close connection to the state establishment as evidence the junior Berger was an establishment candidate.

With the state GOP establishment at his back, the younger Berger scored an easy first place finish in the primary. But the other eight candidates pulled enough votes that Berger's 34 percent share was short of the 40 percent he needed to avoid a runoff.

The second-place finisher and Berger's runoff opponent was Walker, who got 25 percent of the primary vote based on just 11,000 actual votes. (Berger had 17,000 votes.)

This is a small number and well within the range of what a volunteer-driven campaign of voter contact – in contrast to a money-driven mass advertising campaign – could reach. And with only half the primary campaign budget that Berger had, Walker ran a campaign of direct voter contact. On this, all sources agree. More difficult is to determine is how exactly Walker built this campaign.

Walker's friends in the Lawndale Baptist Church had reportedly been prodding their music minister for years to run for Congress. When he finally decided to run, the core of his campaign team was a group of 25 to 35 volunteers who devoted perhaps 5 to 15 hours at least once a week, a source said. Perhaps 40 percent were from Walker's own congregation, 40 percent from other congregations, and the rest from a group called Conservatives for Guilford County, which was described as an active Tea Party group. Members of the Lawndale church had been

among the founders of this group, which indicates the insurgent nature of Walker's core support. Walker was effectively his own campaign manager of the primary campaign.

When Walker's volunteers contacted voters, they were not given scripts to follow; rather, the source said, the campaign left it "to the individual volunteering to use the authenticity of their own connection to the Congressman" as the basis of their message. Whereas the campaign's official messaging often referred to Walker as a pastor, it didn't communicate his particular church or denomination; however it was likely that the unscripted message of volunteers did mention these things, even though there was no coordinated effort to do so, the source said.

When asked whether Walker himself campaigned through church networks, the source replied that "you could absolutely say that." When asked how this worked, the source said, "The congressman had his personal network, a group of pastors that represented churches throughout the district that he stayed in regular contact with, and would form an email chain, or get together occasionally, but it was not a highly organized group." Hence the pastors took whatever steps they did as individuals. Our interview did not further pursue what campaigning through church networks entailed, but it is worth noting that churches often have hundreds or sometimes thousands of members, that Walker's own church had several thousand members, and that Walker's second-place finish in the primary was based on only 11,000 votes. Following Walker's win in the runoff, when he got 18,000 votes to Berger's 12,000, *Cook's Political Report* wrote that "North Carolina observers believe Walker's large congregation, as well as concerns about the Berger family's influence (Phil Berger, Sr. is state senate president) combined to produce the outcome."

Based on all this, we take religious conservatives to be an anchor of Walker's campaign. Friends in his church prodded him to run; congregants of his and other churches formed the backbone of his primary campaign and were left to script their own persuasion messages based on their experience with the candidate; and Walker sought additional informal support through pastors whom he personally knew.

We should add that information about the inner workings of Walker's campaign comes from one highly knowledgeable source and refers only to the primary phase of campaign. Other sources, such as the *Cook* report cited above, could provide only general statements that church congregants were important to Walker's primary success.

Walker's runoff campaign team was larger and continued to rely heavily on volunteers to make voter contacts, but we have little information about it from anyone. But without the aid of religious conservatives – people who knew him well enough to be trusted to construct their own persuasion messages in the primary campaign — Walker might not have made it to the runoff.

There was more to Walker's campaign than his church volunteers and pastor network. From two years before his declaration of candidacy, he began getting to know conservative leaders and officials in the district and he campaigned hard among Tea Party and other activist groups

in his district. Of particular note, Walker secured the endorsements of several county sheriffs – highly respected figures in southern politics – even though Berger, as a county district attorney, would normally get the support of sheriffs, a source said.

North Carolina 7th district

Republican nominee: **David Rouzer**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 3

Anchor: Agribusiness

Coordination: RNCC

Factions: Top two candidates both establishment.

The RNCC backed David Rouzer in 2012 against Democrat incumbent Mike McIntyre, who had been hanging on to the heavily Republican 7th district seat, but Rouzer came up 654 votes short. Unfazed, the RNCC jumped in early in the next cycle, making a Party Committee contribution to Rouzer in November 2013, encouraging national donors to contribute to him, and giving up two staffers to his campaign. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also made an independent expenditure of \$300,000 for Rouzer. With the DNCC's support, McIntyre managed to match Rouzer's prodigious fundraising through the early months of the campaign, but then opted for retirement, thereby leaving Rouzer with a campaign lavishly anchored in donors of the RNCC.

With an undergraduate degree in agricultural business management, agricultural economics, and chemistry,⁴⁵ Rouzer spent most of his career working in a variety of jobs relating to agribusiness. It is hence unsurprising that he has about \$280,000 in farm related contributions. Although both the RNCC and agribusiness gave enough support to be considered anchors of Rouzer's campaign, Rouzer was a champion of state agriculture interests before he got the support of the RNCC, which suggests the former is his more important anchor. However, the RNCC gets credit for coordinating national support on behalf of Rouzer.

His principal opponent, Woody White, had heavy support from lawyers, land developers, insurance, and bankers – a strong indication that he is not an insurgent candidate. It is, then, striking that White has a \$300,000 independent expenditure against him from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and another \$90,000 in attacks from Super PACs. The explanation may be that White is a trial lawyer who was supported by their PAC, American Association for Justice. But however this may be, we see no grounds basis for rating White an insurgent. This seems best understood as an intergroup squabble.

⁴⁵ David Rouzer. Wikipedia. Accessed September 7, 2022.

North Carolina 12th district

Democratic nominee: **Alma Adams**

Method: Party primary with runoff if no candidates get 40 percent of primary vote

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: EMILY's List (group)

Coordination: Possible

Factions: Top two both establishment

FEC data show that Adams received feminist support from three feminist sources: individual contributions conduited through EMILY's List (\$64,000); PAC contributions from feminist groups (\$28,000); and an Independent Expenditure from EMILY's List (\$120,000). These contributions total \$212,000, which is short of the \$250,000 criterion for anchoring.

EMILY's List support for Adams began when she announced her candidacy in late 2013. According to one source, EMILY's List and the AFL-CIO were "exerting a lot of undue pressure on voters" [NC-12-2. 44:30] to discourage other women candidates from joining the race, which suggests field clearing or coordination. Though no details were provided, these observations suggest that EL actively supported Adams beyond just funding her.

As noted in the appendix, we value campaign services that EMILY's List routinely provides its candidates at \$100,000 and assume this was provided to Adams. These services and the direct cash support to Adams meet the \$250,000 criterion for anchoring.

Adams, known as the charismatic "hat lady," was a leading political activist in her area for more than two decades, according to sources and newspaper clips. Support from local community activists might constitute a second and separate anchor for Adams. Multiple sources also said that support from churches, community networks, and sororities (of which Adams was a member) would be the key to the NC-12 race. It seems likely that Adams would have excelled in this form of campaigning, but we have no sources saying that she did. This was partly because most of our sources were from Charlotte rather than in her home base in Greensboro, and partly because all interviews were done two months ahead of the election, before ground games got under way. Searching news accounts on "volunteers," "ground game," "canvassing," and "organization yielded only one hit, as follows from *Roll Call*: "[Adams] has put together the best organization, the most money and has locked " the Greensboro section of the congressional district.⁴⁶

The runner up in the race was Malcolm Graham, a business Democrat with PAC support from the energy industry.

⁴⁶ "Runoff Likely for North Carolina Seat known as 'i-85 District.'" By Emily Cahn, April 7, 2014.

Oklahoma 5th district

Republican nominee: **Steve Russell**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 7

Anchor: Volunteers

Coordination: None

Factions: Russell, insurgent; Douglas, establishment.

Six candidates entered the primary for this safely Republican seat, but only three mounted serious campaigns. One, Patrice Douglas, had the markings of an establishment candidate: A career banker and the head of a state agency that oversees energy and banks, she was endorsed by most of the district's newspapers and most of its mayors. She spent about \$575,000 for a media-heavy campaign and finished second in both the primary and the runoff. Mike Turner, a one-term state legislator, had little going for him except that he was born to wealth. According to news reports, he didn't campaign hard, sometimes skipped events, but spent \$900,000 on a media heavy campaign. He finished fourth in the primary. The primary winner, Steve Russell, was a self-described "Constitutionalist," which indicates an insurgent candidacy. Russell could spend only \$265,000, but had a strong volunteer force that was routinely mentioned in news reports.

In a radio interview during the campaign, Russell said he had 20 to 30 volunteers working on his campaign at any given time and volunteers numbering in the low hundreds overall.⁴⁷ In an on-the-record PoG interview, he said "we could turn out between 40 and 50 at a time on a weekend, and probably turn out half a dozen to a dozen during the week." In response to a question about the importance of the volunteers, he said: "Volunteers were really our whole campaign."

Russell, who had a distinguished career in the U.S. Army Rangers that included leading the unit that captured Saddam Hussein in Iraq, described his volunteers as a "grass roots army" and highlighted his skills as a leader in organizing and assigning specific tasks to each of them and working alongside them in the field. Describing how he mobilized his volunteers, he said:

Hey, look, we've got these four precincts and they're high density and I need half a dozen people and we just go work those... and at the same time you hit those concentrated areas and after a while you begin to secure them and then your signs are appearing everywhere, people are talking, you've created a buzz, and before you know it you got momentum behind you.

I know that's not earth shattering, but that's a lot of what we did.

⁴⁷ "Insights, Issues, and Istook," podcast by Ernest Istook, June 23, 2014. Cited in "Oklahoma's 5th Congressional District: A Candidate-centered race." David A. Moreno and Zachary Rosa. 2015 UCLA class paper for PS 191C.

This evidence shows that low-budget volunteer support can be as important a driver of primary outcomes as more expensive media campaigns. It does not, however, settle the question of whether Russell's volunteer support should count as anchoring. In our conception of the term, an anchoring group must exist independently of the candidate and base its support on pre-campaign experience of the candidate. If the candidate picks up group support during the campaign from a group that had no prior experience with the candidate, it does not count as anchoring. The Russell campaign affords an opportunity not only to see the difference, but to see also the difficulty that interviewers may face when they try to get clear information on fine point that the source has no interest in.

Russell said that the core of his volunteer campaign consisted of six supporters from a previous state legislative race and his own young adult children. He continued:

When we began to expand it, we had an awful lot from my church that I had grown up in, and that had watched my military career with interest and all of that, especially after the Saddam capture, and a lot of families were eager to help and their kids were eager to help. So we were able to draw a lot of ground troops for specific tasks drawing on those extensive family networks. And we had a lot of people helped of all of ages and a lot of the kids would help as well.

This passage suggests that volunteer support did come from a pre-existing group that had experience with Russell, but it was hard to get additional information about the church from Russell. His main interest in explaining through use of military metaphors how he organized his volunteers. The following passage is typical:

The way my military brain works, is, just, I thought: "OK. The terrain is the people. We find the key terrain, and those are the key people. If we hit the key people, we hold the high ground, and if we hold the high ground we build momentum, and if we got momentum, all these other people will be playing catch up. And if we ring all the periphery and we create an excitement that shows a lot of activity, then we can go into people's back yards and turn the momentum, and that's exactly what we were able to do.

As the campaign progressed, it attracted a variety of additional support, as shown in the following exchanges with the POG interviewer:

PoG: So, getting outside the church community, there were other groups that might have been involved?

Russell. Yeah, of course, you had your Republican women, they would be great for calling great for calling. We employed a lot of elderly women to make our calls. We wanted women that sounded like your grandmother, and here's why, because people aren't gonna hang up on grandma. ...

PoG: Were these from your church or somewhere else?

Russell: A lot of them were from church and from Republican women's groups that we had persuaded, and they wanted to help us and so we were able to do that.

PoG: So what about veterans groups. Any veterans groups get.. ?

Russell: Yeah. We sure did. We had a lot of veterans help us. I forget what the campaign slogans are, but 'Enlist in Russell's regulars' or army or whatever. We had a lot of that type of stuff.

PoG: Were they integrated in with all precinct work or were they on kind of a separate track?

Russell: You know, they were great to be the organizers, the military veterans. ... they'd go out with the volunteers. They would just kind of naturally fall into ranks and then you'd go out and you'd knock out the plan. And you put it on a map and they'd get it, you know, they'd spatially understand what we were trying to do. And they'd go after the voters

From these passages, it appears that some "Republican women" were added to Russell's volunteers during the campaign but shown not count as part of an anchoring group. The veterans probably did have prior experience with Russell, but may not have constituted a large part of the campaign.

How important, then, were the church volunteers? The PoG interview attempted to get Russell to expand on their importance, but he was more interested in discussing how he had organized them. Here is the exchange:

PoG. And. OK. And your ground troops, so the ground troops were coming predominantly from your church and families within the church, and different of them would turn out

Russell. [[cuts in] Yeah. Friends and associations and all of that. And we would say, OK, we're going to work this area today. We need some help. We're gonna cover this ground. And then we would do sign blitzes at the same time, where we would just go plaster an intersection. And we knew that they were gonna tear it all down, but if we hit em at a Friday evening, the code officials wouldn't come out until Monday, so we'd at least have 'em all weekend.

JZ: So, I'm interested, you're giving me kind of, I don't know, tactics or something, and I'm just interested, you know, wanna make sure that I understand where these people are coming from. So. You said it's kinda your church is your base, and different

groups, subgroups, of that the base, or the core group of followers, would come out on different days, and you would take them between a half a dozen and maybe 40 of them, depending, on the day, and do a

Russell: [cuts in] Right

PoG: precinct. OK. So I think I have that.

Russell. Yeah, we'd go hit core areas. Yeah. Because sometimes you could cover even more. So, for example, if you had a 350-voter precinct ...

Altogether, then, we have information from Russell that "an awful lot" of his volunteer support came from his church and that some additional but secondary support from Republican women and veterans. In combination with Russell's statement that he regularly had large numbers of volunteers – six to 12 during the week, 40 to 50 on weekends – we judge that Russell's campaign got off the ground with help from a group that had prior experience with him and thereby possibly provided enough support to convey viability on his campaign. However, we shall leave this case unclassified while we pursue more detailed information about the nature of Russell's church support.

Pennsylvania 6th district

Republican nominee: **Ryan Costello**

Method: Traditional primary

Number of primary candidates: 1

Anchor: County Party Committee

Coordination: County Party Committee

Faction: Establishment

The Chester County Republican Committee effectively cleared the field for Ryan Costello, thereby assuring him not only viability but success in the primary. See discussion in text.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Our understanding of this race made use of the paper “Pennsylvania 6,” by Christine Kabayan in PS 191C in Spring quarter 2016. The paper is available online with other materials for this Online Appendix.

Pennsylvania 13th district

Democratic nominee: **Brendan Boyle**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 4

Anchor: IBEW-led union coalition (group)

Coordination: IBEW-led coalition

Factions: Top two both establishment candidates.

State Senator Brendan Boyle got the bulk of union endorsements and nearly all union contributions. According to our analysis of FEC records, the latter amounted to \$429,000, a haul that meets our criterion for group anchoring. But money was not Boyle's chief campaign asset: He spent less than any of his opponents while deploying the most volunteers. Local unions put 500 workers on the streets to knock doors for Boyle over the month prior to the election and on election day they had monitors at all polling locations. At one of these locations, we observed vans dropping off loads of persons wearing union tea shirts and heading into the polls to vote. So was a strong ground campaign, then, Boyle's chief campaign asset?

Perhaps not. The unions that supplied Boyle with both money and volunteers are a formidable political machine. According to a feature story in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, they constitute the biggest independent donor group in the state. The leader is John J. Dougherty, Jr of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Dougherty, said a good government leader quoted by the *Inquirer*, "cares about power and influence more than anything else, and he's been very successful at aggregating that." As the paper continued:

"Dougherty has the capacity to dictate or strongly influence who else gives to his candidates," said Thomas Massaro, a former city housing czar who offers a crash course to rookie Council members on how City Hall works.

"He can get seven or eight other union PACs to give to you, or not to give to you," Massaro said. "And he has a seamless web of other contributors - electrical contractors, suppliers, and developers, people who have needs to be addressed in City Hall."

Plus, the local's ability to field hundreds of workers on Election Day and spend six-figure sums on consultants, street money, and advertising is legendary.

Then there is the network of Democratic ward leaders whose organizations regularly receive Local 98 donations, giving a leg up to its preferred candidates - especially in primaries for low-profile offices such as judgeships.⁴⁹

Four candidates with ties to the IBEW machine initially took out papers to run in the PA-13 primary, but once the IBEW support for Boyle became clear, two dropped out. We have only slight evidence that the IBEW pressured them to withdraw, but even if there was no direct pressure, it would have been clear that running against IBEW-backed Boyle was futile. The fourth candidate with IBEW ties, Daylin Leach, did remain in the race. He raised money from non-union sources, ran a vigorous campaign, but finished third in the four-candidate field.

⁴⁹ "How electricians unions became huge force in Pa. elections." Bob Warner. *Philadelphia Inquirer*. May 19,2014.

We take this combination of evidence to indicate that the IBEW's massive support for Boyle partially cleared the field for him and suspect that of the three forms of support Boyle got from the IBEW machine – money, volunteers, and field clearing – the last may have been the most important anchor to his campaign.

The second-place finisher in the race was Margorie Margolies. She had served one term in the House from 1993 to 1994 and set out at age 73 to take her old seat back. She had three big three assets. One was widespread public recognition from hosting a local TV talk show. Another was that her son had married Chelsea Clinton, a Cinderella story heavily covered in the Philadelphia media. And the third was lingering gratitude among Bill Clinton era liberals – including the former president himself -- for providing, at grave cost to her standing back home, the pivotal vote in the House of Representatives for Clinton's 1993 federal budget.

Both the union candidate and the Clinton family candidate were establishment candidates. The third and fourth are examples of 2014 Democratic insurgents – far to the left, but not provoking civil war over it. Daylin Leach, a senior state legislator who called himself the “liberal lion,” had the support of the Progressive Change Campaign Committee, Daily Kos, and Move-on. Valarie Arkoosh, a medical school professor supported by left-leaning medical groups, wanted a much expanded role of the federal government in health care, including single payer health insurance.

South Carolina 1st district

Republican nominee: **Mark Sanford**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 17

Anchor: None

Coordination: None

Faction: Top two both insurgent.

Mark Sanford served three terms in the House of Representatives and eight years as governor of South Carolina before leaving office 2011. While in the House he was rated its most conservative member by the Cato Institute and praised by other conservative groups. He opposed provisions for his own district that he considered “pork,” including an important appropriation for Charleston Harbor. In his first year as governor, he vetoed 106 bills passed by the conservative Republican legislature and was overridden by it on 105. After one disappointment, he turned pigs loose on the floor of the legislature to dramatize wasteful spending.

His final year as governor was marred by a widely publicized incident in which he led colleagues to believe he was taking time off from work to go hiking on the Appalachian Trail but was later discovered to be having an extramarital affair in Argentina. His reputation was further damaged by a messy divorce and the revelation that he had used state money for travel relating to the affair.

When Sanford’s old House seat came open in a special election in 2013, Sanford and 16 other Republicans – but none of them strong candidates – jumped in. In consequence of his recent troubles, no important leaders, groups or PACs supported him, nor did news reports in the last 30 days of the campaign mention significant grassroots support that might have served to anchor of his campaign. We therefore classify Sanford campaign, which easily prevailed in both the primary and runoff, as candidate-centered.

Club for Growth conduited some contributions to Sanford even though it didn’t endorse him. Club’s assistance plus Sanford’s record as House member and governor justify classification of him as an insurgent.

The second-place primary candidate, Curtis Bostic, is a harder call, but is best described as an insurgent as well. His main campaign theme, according to Ballotpedia, was the need to cut government spending. Given his opponent, Bostic must been quite conservative on this issue to hold his own. In one of the few prestige endorsements in the race, Bostic got the support of Rick Santorum, who ran as an insurgent candidate for the GOP presidential nomination in 2012. Finally, Bostic was a home schooler and argued for less government interference with this form of education.

Texas 36th district

Republican nominee: **Brian Babin**

Method: Party primary followed up runoff if no candidate reaches 50 percent

Number of primary candidates: 10

Anchor: Dentists (group)

Coordination: None

Faction: Babin, establishment; Streusand, insurgent.

Before running for Congress in 2014, Babin, a dentist, held numerous elected and appointive positions, one of which was as president of the Texas State Board of Dental Examiners from 1981 to 1987. Dentists and dentistry related groups and individuals contributed \$270,000 to Babin's campaign, thus qualifying as an anchor.

Babin led in organizing the Republican Party in east Texas in the 1980s when the area was still Democratic and by 2014 had developed deep political roots in the area. Following the 2014 campaign, Babin thanked more than 100 activists for their help, which suggests had a substantial volunteer ground game. Volunteer forces of this magnitude can be extremely important, but we lack evidence to credit any of Babin's success to this source.

Babin also received campaign help through serving 14 years on the Lower Neches River Authority, a state body that regulates economic activity in a six-county section of the lower Neches River basin. The board manages activity in ports and oil refineries on the coast, agriculture in a six-county area, river development projects, and recreation. The appointive position gave Babin opportunities to interact with businesses in the most economically active section of the mostly rural east Texas congressional district. A source told us that members of the Neches board not only contributed themselves to Babin's campaign, but hosted fundraisers for Babin with their associates off the board. Leaders of two neighboring river authorities, for the Sabine and Trinity rivers, also organized fundraisers for Babin. Babin's experience with port issues on the lower Neches enabled him to appeal to port and energy interests in nearby Houston. We estimate that Babin raised about \$90,000, or 12 percent of his total spending, from business PACs affected by the three Texas river board authorities to which Babin had a connection.

A curious feature of Babin's campaign is that that he received about \$70,000, or 10 percent of total campaign spending, from banks, investors, and financial analysts, according to our analysis of FEC data. What makes this curious is that Babin's principal opponent, Ben Streusand, was a mortgage and investment banker who had been president of the Texas Mortgage Bankers Association and who nonetheless received almost no support from the banking and finance sector. If Babin had any connection to financial interests, it did not come up in our interviews, but the Babin campaign did attack Streusand's work in finance, alleging that he had been responsible for thousands of people losing their homes in financial crash of 2008 and costing tax payers millions of dollars in bailouts. A final point that may explain this set of facts is that

Streusand ran as a Tea Party Republican, had the support of the most important Tea Party groups in the district, and was a former president of Americans for Prosperity, Texas. Since Tea Party activists tend to be suspicious of banks and financiers, these groups may have been wary of him and considered the establishment candidate, Babin, a better choice for financial interests.

Virginia 8th district

Democratic nominee: **Don Beyer**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates: 8

Anchor: Candidate-centered

Coordination: No

Faction: Establishment

A dozen candidates entered this solidly Democratic seat in the northern Virginia suburbs of Washington D.C. Eight remained through the primary, but all but one lacked significant support or voter recognition. The exception was Beyer, a former state Lieutenant General, gubernatorial candidate, and namesake of a prominent automobile business in the district. He had also been a regional fundraiser for Barack Obama, which marks him as an establishment candidate.

Beyer got 44 percent of the House primary vote compared to 18 percent for the second-place finisher. Beyer also spent 46 percent of all money in the race compared to 11 percent for the second-place finisher, a huge advantage that was due partly a \$400,000 personal loan that Beyer made to his campaign.

Beyer ran a prominent auto dealership in the district, which might have been a basis for group support. But Beyer raised only \$100,000 (compared to total spending of \$1.6 million) from auto-related businesses and individuals. Only two of the major auto manufacturers, Ford and Toyota, made PAC contributions and these came to only \$3,000. Finally, we encountered no evidence of volunteer or other support for Beyer from the auto sector.

Personal relationships with donors from his previous work as a fundraiser was perhaps the basis of his ability to raise money for himself, but it does not constitute evidence of group support. Given all this, we count Beyer's campaign as candidate centered.

The second-place finisher in the race, Patrick Hope, appears to be a conventional Democrat. He calls himself a progressive, but in his campaign materials emphasized the need for a candidate who could build seniority in order to best serve the district.

Virginia 10th district

Republican nominee: **Barbara Comstock**

Method: Firehouse primary

Number of primary candidates: 6

Anchor: GOP party and secondarily business establishment

Coordination: District Republican Party

Factions: Comstock, establishment; Marshall, insurgent.

Virginia's 10th congressional district leaned Republican in 2014, but had sharply different blue and red sections. The northern part lay inside the DC beltway and was heavily populated by government workers and Democrats, while the southern part was more Republican and Tea Party, with most Republican voters in the southern part. When the 15-term Democratic incumbent announced his retirement in late 2013, the Republican Party faced the challenge of finding someone who was sufficiently conservative to win the primary and moderate enough to compete against the Democrats in the fall election.

We obtained interviews with three activists in this district, but *Washington Post* coverage of the race is more informative. An early story described a classic ideological contest:

Though the field remains in flux, the two most certain GOP candidates so far are Del. Barbara J. Comstock (Fairfax), who has deep ties to prominent state and national Republican figures, and state Sen. Richard H. Black (Loudoun), who is known for a conservative grass-roots following and a history of inflammatory remarks about social issues.⁵⁰

Comstock and Black both declared their candidacies for the Republican nomination, but as reported by another *Post* story, it took an unexpected turn:

On Wednesday, state Sen. Richard H. Black (Loudoun) made the surprise announcement that he was dropping out of the race for [the House] seat, just two days after he officially launched his campaign. Black said he made the decision after meeting with fellow Republican senators in Richmond and hearing concerns that the party could lose his [state Senate] seat if he were elected to Congress.

Black is an outspoken conservative [with a history] that made GOP leaders wary of his candidacy

His decision removed Comstock's most formidable foe and the person most likely to pull her to the right during a nomination fight in a race where the nominee will need to reach out to moderates and independents in the general election.⁵¹

⁵⁰ "Race to succeed Frank Wolf in Congress could feature sharp Republican divide." Ben Pershing, *Washington Post*, January 7, 2014. (Downloaded 10-25-21)

⁵¹ "Barbara Comstock gets boost as GOP field narrows in race for Frank Wolf's House seat." Ben Pershing, *Washington Post*, January 25, 2014. (Downloaded 10-25-21)

The Republican official who was our best source in this district was not entirely forthcoming about these events, volunteering that Black could probably have won the Congressional seat if he had pursued it and failing to mention the pressure on him from party leaders to drop out. We nonetheless view the events described in the *Post* stories as a fairly standard instance of field shaping for the purpose increasing the party's chances to win the general election. Its only notable feature is that, as the *Post* reported, the Republican National Campaign Committee stayed out for the race, leaving the job entirely to local officials.

And local party officials had one more trick up their sleeves. Under Virginia law, parties can choose to make nomination by one of three means: A traditional state-run primary; a congressional district convention with lax attendance rules; or a "party canvass," which is also called a firehouse primary. The latter is a primary election that is 1) held on a different day than other primaries, 2) has fewer voting locations, and 3) requires voters to sign a loyalty pledge to the party. All three of these features tend to limit participation to party loyalists, and in intraparty discussions, Comstock's backers supported the "firehouse primary" option. Her strongest opponent at this point was Bob Marshall, a state legislator who wanted the nomination to be made by a convention. Marshall was described by our source as the "grassroots Tea Party alternative" to Comstock [VA-10_3; 51]. Marshall also had the support of the Eagle Forum PAC.

The state party followed Comstock's wish for a firehouse primary. The source – the same one who neglected to mention that party leaders had pressured Black out of the race said – the decision for the firehouse primary was based on good government considerations. Perhaps, but it is easy to see why it was the best option for Comstock: It would have a much smaller electorate than a regular primary and would therefore be easier to control, yet the participants would not be so few as in a convention, where a candidate with a small but intense following might mobilize enough supporters to take over the process.

We judge that the pressure on Black to quit the race and the decision for a firehouse primary are evidence of local party coordination on behalf of its preferred candidate, Comstock.

As a separate matter, Comstock had very strong support from Republican businesses in the northern part of the district, which was due to her energetic homestyle as a state legislator, and from party leaders in Washington DC, which was due to several party jobs she held over the previous 15 years. We view the campaign she ran against outgunned Bob Marshall and three also-rans as having been anchored in, 1) her party, which persuaded her strongest opponent to leave the race, and 2) business, whose PACs contribution went to her to Marshall by a ratio of \$99,000 to nothing. Comstock got 53 percent of the firehouse primary vote compared to 28 percent for the runner up, Marshall.

Washington 4th District

Republican nominee: **Dan Newhouse**

Method: Top Two Primary

Number of primary candidates: 11

Anchor: Agribusiness (group)

Coordination: NA

Factions: Newhouse, establishment; Didier, insurgent.

Newhouse owned an 850-acre farm that grew hops, tree fruit, grapes, and alfalfa, the main crops in his mainly agricultural section of eastern Washington. In 2003 he won election to a state assembly district that his father, also a farmer, had represented for 30 years. Newhouse became a leader on agricultural issues in the Assembly and, though he was a Republican, won appointment from a Democratic governor to lead the state Department of agriculture, a position he held for four years before making a run for Congress in 2014. Seven other Republicans ran as well, but none with anything like Newhouse's credentials for serving the district's agricultural interests.

Jon Devaney, president of the Washington State Fruit Tree Association, spoke on the record about Newhouse's primary campaign. In this and other races like it, he observed, the real decisions about candidates are made by "civic leaders" – a group in which he counted business leaders, the hospital board, the fair board, and farmers. These leaders decided not by formal deliberation, but by informal discussion. "It's more like people talking all the time, 'what do you think about this, what do you think about that,' and these conversations can build informal momentum on their own over time."⁵² Politicians are part of the conversation, "jockeying for position" and making career decisions based on their prospects. As early as 2009, when Newhouse became state agriculture commissioner, he was viewed by community leaders as likely to make a strong House candidate when the current Member of Congress retired, and by ambitious politicians as someone they would not want to run against. The result was that some of the strongest potential opponents of Newhouse made career decisions that would have left them "out of position" if Newhouse had decided not to run when the House seat came eventually open in 2014.

DeVaney said that his Fruit Tree Association made no endorsement in the House race and that farmers made "their own calls" on whom to support. These calls overwhelmingly favored Newhouse. FEC data shows that Newhouse received \$600,000 from farmers and farm-related businesses, which amounted to about 70 percent of his total campaign contributions. None of the other seven Republican candidates got as much as \$50,000 from agriculture sources. One of those seven, alfalfa farmer Clint Didier, mounted a strong campaign against Newhouse – indeed, beat him in the first stage of Washington's All-Party primary – but Didier was a Tea Party insurgent who drew his main support from elsewhere.

⁵² The quotes are approximate, based on hand notes that were dictated into a recorder immediately upon completion of the interview.

West Virginia 2nd district

Republican nominee: **Alex Mooney**

Method: Party primary

Number of primary candidates:

Anchor: Ideological network

Coordination: None

Factions: Insurgent, Mooney; establishment, Reed

The traditionally Democratic state of West Virginia was sliding rapidly toward the GOP in 2014 when the state's 2nd congressional district came open. Its retiring incumbent was a Republican, the district had voted for Mitt Romney in 2012 by more than 10 percentage points, and national tides in 2014 were favorable to Republican candidates. The West Virginia 2nd was therefore an open seat that only a Republican would likely be able to win.

At the same time, Democrats still controlled both houses of the West Virginia legislature and Republican Party organization in the second district was still getting off the ground. Hence the local party was, in the admission of its leadership, unable to clear the field for or in other ways aid its preferred candidate, Charlotte Lane, a former state legislator (WVA-02_04; 21:00 – 25:30).

Lane nonetheless had important advantages. Of the 37 business and professional PACs that made contributions in this race, 26 gave to Lane. Measured in dollar terms, 73 percent of this interest group money went to Lane. Lane also got 57 percent of the contributions made by individual West Virginians. In a seven-person field, this was a strong showing. Yet Lane, the party and business choice, finished third in overall fundraising and third in the balloting.

First in both of these categories was Alex Mooney, a just-arrived transplant from Maryland, where he had been a staunchly conservative state senator for 12 years and chair of the state Republican Party for two. Mooney had filed papers in Maryland to run in a House primary in 2012, but withdrew. Leaving the office of state party chair in early 2103, he moved 30 miles across the state line into West Virginia, where he entered the 2014 primary for the open 2nd district, running as a “down-the-line, check-the-box, Tea Party Conservative,” according to a source (WVA-02_03; 21:00). The result was “a classic Tea Party vs. Establishment” contest between Mooney and Lane – though one in which Lane could not even finish second [WVA-02_04; 21:20).

As a Tea Party conservative, Mooney got only \$9,000 from business PACs but a boatload of libertarian, Tea Party and other far right PAC contributions from values PACs that included Club for Growth, Madison Project, Eagle Forum, and Family Research Council. Mooney ended up with \$158,000 in Independent Expenditures from right wing groups and some \$125,000 in direct contributions from the PACs of conservative groups and politicians, which meets the

\$250,000 criterion for anchoring.⁵³ (For some candidates, we could discern group influence in individual contributions – e.g., pharmacists for Buddy Carter – but we could not identify conservatives for Mooney in FEC data, which suggests the anchoring interests of national conservatives in Mooney’s campaign is underestimated by our estimate.)

Mooney was almost entirely a national candidate: The largest part of his financial support came from individual contributions, but only 4 percent of these were from West Virginia contributors, and not a single dollar of Mooney’s Independent Expenditure or PAC contributions came from West Virginia. The rest came from individuals in his former home state of Maryland (24 percent) and individuals around the country.

The runner-up in fundraising and vote share was Ken Reed, a pharmacist who had never previously held office. His campaign was mainly supported by a \$525,000 self-loan and got no help from professional pharmacy associations or any business PAC.

Despite differences in the support coalitions of the candidates, “There was not a lot of difference on the issues” according to a close observer of the election. For every candidate the line was, “You’re strongly pro-life, you’re for the repeal of the Affordable Care Act, and you’re going to fight the EPA until the last breath in your lungs.” The second amendment, added this source, was also important. “And then it’s just about who has the money and campaigns better. Who is the better representative of those conservative principles?” (WVA-02_03; 35:40)

We will take this guidance as a basis for classifying Reed as establishment; Mooney’s history and support base are, however, too strong to overlook. We classify him as insurgent.

Our three sources for this race agreed that Mooney was the most aggressive campaigner. He hit Lane for a two decades old position on abortion that she had long since changed. Two sources mentioned Mooney’s attack on Reed as a “pharmacist who sells abortion drugs to minors” – a charge that could be leveled against any general pharmacist. Said a source, “I was, like, ‘Wow, that’s good politics, but really gray in the ethics area .. How can you refute that?’” (WVA—2_04; 31:40). Said one of the seven candidates in this race,

My take on Alex is that he is extremely genuine, extremely hardworking and persevering... Alex worked harder in the race than the six others combined. He was everywhere... Sacrificed his family, sacrificed a lot of things, which I wasn’t willing to ... I made the piano recitals, I made the soccer games. (WVA—02_02; 4:10)

⁵³ Mooney received about \$54,000 from generally conservative groups (most importantly Senate Conservative Fund and FreedomWorks), about \$27,000 from conservative issue groups (on abortion, guns, Cuba, right-to-work), and about \$25,000 from individual conservative politicians.

Mooney got 44 percent of the vote in a primary in which turnout was about 15 percent.⁵⁴ Reed and Lane got 22 and 18 percent of the vote. Some local Republicans were upset with Mooney's nomination and formed a public committee of "Republicans for Casey", the Democratic nominee, but Mooney squeaked by Casey in the general election by a margin of 47 percent to 44 percent. This was a weak showing in favorable Republican year and a district with a Cook PVI score of +11R.

To summarize: A hard-hitting Tea Party conservative finished at the head of a large field of local candidates. But the winner exhibited little ideological distinctiveness in his campaign messaging. Rather, his money and campaign effort in a fragmented field, much more than ideological distinctiveness, seemed to have driven the outcome of the race.

⁵⁴ West Virginia allows independents to vote in whichever primary they prefer, so party turnout rates are not available. But a total of 70,000 voted in both the Democratic and Republican primaries in a district with perhaps 500,000 voting eligible adults.

Wisconsin 6th district

Republican nominee: **Glenn Grothman**

Method: Traditional primary

Number of primary candidates: 5

Anchor: Unclassified pending further research

Coordination: NA

Factions: Grothman, insurgent; Leibham, establishment

If money could buy votes, two-term state legislator Duey Stroebel would have been the easy winner of this primary. The millionaire spent around \$800,000 for his primary campaign, most of it out of his own pocket. This spending compared to around \$435,000 by business candidate Joe Leibham and \$450,000 by the more conservative, Glenn Grothman. Yet Stroebel got only 23 percent of the primary vote compared to 35.8 percent for Leibham and 36.2 percent for Grothman -- a victory margin for the later of only 219 votes.

We were unable to conduct interviews in this district and the Grothman's congressional office declined our request to speak to someone knowledgeable about the campaign. But the case is an interesting and has some good media coverage. So although we are unable to offer a classification of the race, we will describe what we have learned from public sources.

Leibham was a six-term state legislator then serving as Republican leader in the Senate. Our usual index of business preference is the ratio of business PAC contributions to the top candidates. This ratio was \$70,000 Leibham to \$4,500 for Grothman to nothing for Stroebel, which makes Leibham the clear business favorite. Yet the total money Leibham raised was only \$425,000, the lowest amount by any business favorite in our study. Leibham's most important advantage in the race was perhaps that his state senate district fell entirely within the boundaries of the House district, which gave him a block of voters accustomed to voting for him. By contrast, only about 10 percent of Grothman's district fell within the House district.

Now to Grothman, who developed a reputation in the legislature for going his own way regardless of ideological or factional convention. But his views were usually far to the right, not infrequently to the point of controversy. He proposed, for example, that that single parenthood be included in the state's definition of child abuse because children born out of wedlock are more likely to have lower incomes and higher crime rates. Grothman's independent-mindedness is no doubt part of the explanation for the strong preference of business for Leibham and is also part of our reason for viewing Grothman as an insurgent.

Leibman's low spending was a gift to Grothman who, as an insurgent, would normally need to worry about being outspent by a business favorite. Yet Grothman, with a self-loan in the primary of \$130,000, not only matched but slightly exceeded Leibman's spending. He also enjoyed two advantages due to his status as the anti-establishment candidate. One was that the 6th district is in the heart of conservative talk radio country and the two leading local hosts of this genre were firmly in Grothman's corner. News reports explaining Grothman's narrow win pointed to the influence of conservative radio.

Grothman's second advantage was that, according to *WisPolitics*, he "has been a favorite of the grassroots after years of attending events and being a warrior for the cause."⁵⁵ Another *WisPolitics* post said "[i]nsiders say Grothman's support is coming from the party's grassroots, folks who will not only turn out early on Tuesday, but will drag 10 of their friends along."⁵⁶ Cook Political Reports wrote that "Grothman speaks as provocatively as a talk radio host and has ginned up a loud Tea Party following."⁵⁷

These reports suggest Grothman may have anchored his campaign in grass roots volunteers, but lack specificity. We shall leave therefore leave the case unclassified while we pursue further information. But Grothman's record in the legislature, his grassroots and Tea Party support, and a PAC contribution from the anti-establishment Eagle Forum, warrant classification of him as an insurgent.

⁵⁵ *WisPolitics*, July 18, 2014. Downloaded 7-12-17.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* August 2, 2014.

⁵⁷ June 20, 2014.

5. Summary Table

District	Name	Anchor type	Anchor
AL1R	Byrne	G	State business
AL1R	Young	-	?
AL6R	Palmer	G	Conservative network
AL6R	Demarco	-	
AR2R	Hill	G	Little Rock business
AR2R	Clemmer	-	-
AR2R	Reynolds	-	-
AR4R	Westerman	G	Local Tea Party chapter
AR4R	Moll	-	-
AZ7D	Gallego	G	Unions
AZ7D	Wilcox	-	-
CA11D	Desaulnier	P	National party
CA11D	Sudduth	-	-
CA25R	Knight	P	Local office holders
CA25R	Strickland	-	-
CA31D	Aguilar	P	DCCC
CA31D	Reyes	-	-
CA33D	Lieu	G	Asian Am. Donors
CA33D	Greuel	-	-
CA35D	Torres	G	Unions
CA35D	Gagnier	-	-
CA45D	Raths	-	-
CA45R	Walters	None	-
CO4R	Buck	P	RNCC
CO4R	Renfroe	-	-
FL13R	Jolly	P	Donor IPO
FL13R	Peters	-	-
FL13R	Bircher	-	-
FL19R	Clawson	None	-
FL19R	Benacquisto	-	-

GA10R	Hice	G	Church group
GA10R	Collins	-	-
GA11R	Loudermilk	G	Church groups
GA11R	Barr	-	-
GA1R	Carter	G	Pharmacists
GA1R	Johnson	-	-
HI1D	Takai	G	Veterans
HI1D	Kim	-	-
IA1D	Murphy	G	Unions
IA1D	Vernon	-	-
IA3D	Appel	P	DCCC, EMILY's List
IA3R	Zaun	None	-
IA3R	Cramer	-	-
IL2D	Kelly	NA	-
IL2D	Halvorson	-	-
LA5R	McAllister	None	-
LA5R	Riser	-	-
LA6R	Graves	G	Maritime sector
LA6R	Dietzel	-	-
MA5D	Clark	G	Feminist groups
MA5D	Koutoujian	-	-
ME2D	Cain	G	DCCC, EMILY's List
ME2D	Jackson	-	-
ME2R	Poliquin	NA	-
ME2R	Raye	-	-
MI12D	Dingell	P	Party establishment
MI12D	Mullins	-	-
MI14D	Lawrence	G	EMILY's List
MI14D	Hobbs	-	-
MI4R	Moolenaar	P	Informal local party
MI4R	Mitchell	-	-
MI8R	Bishop	P	Informal local party
MI8R	McMillin	-	-
MN6R	Emmer	P	Party convention
MN6R	Sivarajan	-	-
MT0R	Zinke	G	Veterans
MT0R	Stapleton	-	-

MT0R	Rosendale		
NC12D	Adams	G	EMILY's List
NC12D	Graham	-	-
NC6R	Walker	G	Church group
NC6R	Berger	-	-
NC7R	Rouzer	G	Agribusiness
NC7R	White	-	-
NJ12D	Coleman	P	Local party
NJ12D	Greenstein	-	-
NJ1D	Norcross	G	Unions
NJ1D	Broomell	-	NA
NJ3R	MacArthur	P	Local party
NJ3R	Lonegan	-	-
NY21D	Wolf	P	Local party
NY21R	Stefanik	P	Republican establishment
NY21R	Doheny	-	-
NY4D	Rice	P	DCCC
NY4D	Abrahams	-	-
NY4R	Blakeman	P	Local party
NY4R	Scaturro	-	-
OK5R	Russell	NA	-
OK5R	Douglas	-	-
PA13D	Boyle	G	Unions
PA13R	Margolies	-	-
PA6R	Costello	P	Local party
SC1R	Sanford	None	-
SC1R	Bostic	-	NA
TX36R	Babin	G	Dentists
TX36R	Streusand	-	-
VA10R	Comstock	P	Local party
VA10R	Marshall	-	-
VA8D	Beyer	None	-
VA8D	Hope	-	-
WA4R	Newhouse	G	Fruit growers
WA4R	Didier	-	-
WI6R	Grothman	NA	-
WI6R	Leibham	-	-

WV2R	Mooney	G	Conservative network
WV2R	Reed	-	-